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The	  energy	  policy	  arena	  is	  saturated	  with	  technocratic	  examinations	  of	  what	  makes	  an	  
energy	  policy	  successful.	  By	  speaking	  about	  why	  a	  policy	  instrument	  is	  successful	  rather	  than	  
how	  it	  came	  to	  be	  this	  way	  treats	  the	  success	  of	  its	  adoption	  separate	  from	  the	  specific	  
historical	  contexts	  from	  which	  the	  policy	  emerged.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  illuminate	  what	  becomes	  lost	  
in	  this	  way	  of	  thinking,	  this	  thesis	  examines	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  renewable	  portfolio	  standard	  
(RPS),	  a	  widely-­‐popular	  renewable	  energy	  policy	  among	  U.S.	  states.	  This	  thesis	  shows	  how	  the	  
RPS	  was	  not	  always	  the	  immanent	  policy	  outcome	  it	  is	  thought	  of	  as	  today	  and	  that	  it	  initially	  
lost	  to	  another	  policy	  instrument.	  This	  thesis	  places	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  RPS	  in	  the	  larger	  
context	  of	  the	  electricity	  restructuring	  movement	  of	  the	  1990s.	  It	  explains	  why	  the	  policy	  was	  
developed	  out	  of	  necessity—and	  first	  introduced	  in	  California—due	  to	  renewable	  energy	  
industry	  concerns	  that	  renewables	  would	  be	  marginalized	  in	  a	  competitive	  electricity	  market.	  
The	  thesis	  elucidates	  two	  intertwined	  dimensions	  of	  the	  contestation	  over	  what	  policy	  
instrument	  should	  be	  used	  to	  promote	  renewables:	  a	  policy	  instrument	  debate	  and	  a	  political	  
economy	  debate.	  It	  shows	  that	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  acknowledge	  both	  debates	  in	  trying	  to	  understand	  
why	  a	  policy	  instrument	  succeeds	  (or	  fails).	  The	  political	  economy	  debate	  also	  shows	  the	  policy	  
making	  process	  not	  as	  a	  predictable,	  entrenched	  space	  of	  power-­‐laden	  politics,	  but	  rather,	  a	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dynamic	  system	  of	  institutions	  and	  actors	  affected	  with	  different	  values,	  orientations,	  and	  
obligations	  trying	  to	  negotiate	  a	  desirable	  policy	  outcome.	  Though	  a	  political	  landscape	  is	  often	  
well-­‐established,	  the	  dynamic	  interaction	  of	  its	  stakeholders	  sometimes	  gives	  way	  to	  gaps	  of	  
opportunity,	  where	  a	  novel—even	  controversial—policy	  idea	  can	  take	  hold.	  This	  more-­‐nuanced	  
understanding	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  process	  helps	  change	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  possibilities	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1 INTRODUCTION	  	  
Today,	  32	  U.S.	  states	  and	  territories	  have	  adopted	  a	  renewable	  portfolio	  standard	  (RPS).	  
What	  began	  as	  a	  policy	  idea	  minted	  in	  California	  in	  the	  1990s	  has	  emerged	  as	  an	  important	  
regulatory	  driver	  for	  developing	  renewable	  energy	  in	  the	  U.S.	  In	  explaining	  the	  policy’s	  
popularity,	  scholars	  often	  state	  the	  combination	  of	  regulatory	  mandate	  and	  a	  mechanism	  for	  
market	  deference	  makes	  the	  RPS	  well	  suited	  for	  the	  American	  political	  system,	  implying	  that	  
the	  policy	  owes	  much	  of	  its	  success	  to	  its	  design.1	  Regression	  analyses	  that	  have	  attempted	  to	  
explain	  different	  factors	  influencing	  state	  RPS	  enactments	  have	  also	  assumed	  that	  the	  policy	  is	  
an	  immanent	  choice	  for	  policy	  makers.	  However,	  was	  this	  always	  the	  case?	  Where	  did	  the	  RPS	  
come	  from?	  How	  did	  it	  gain	  traction	  as	  a	  policy	  idea?	  What	  other	  policy	  instruments	  were	  also	  
considered	  for	  supporting	  renewables?	  How	  did	  policy	  makers	  evaluate	  these	  instruments?	  And	  
was	  the	  RPS	  always	  the	  given	  outcome	  it’s	  assumed	  to	  be	  today?	  
Dominant	  narratives	  about	  policy	  decisions	  often	  treat	  them	  as	  determinative	  choices.	  
Scholars	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  befitting	  the	  RPS	  has	  become	  the	  dominant	  renewables	  policy	  among	  
states	  because	  of	  its	  appeal	  to	  modern	  American	  political	  and	  economic	  values.	  Known	  to	  few,	  
the	  RPS	  did	  not	  emerge	  as	  the	  victorious	  policy	  when	  it	  was	  first	  introduced	  in	  California.	  
However,	  if	  one	  were	  to	  reveal	  that	  the	  RPS	  initially	  lost	  to	  a	  weaker	  policy	  instrument	  
advocated	  by	  investment-­‐owned	  utilities	  (IOUs),	  many	  would	  probably	  be	  eager	  to	  explain	  the	  
outcome	  as	  unsurprising,	  given	  prevalent	  narratives	  about	  regulatory	  capture.2	  By	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  RPS	  scholars	  aren’t	  aware	  of	  other	  factors	  that	  have	  contributed	  to	  RPS	  adoption	  in	  
many	  states,	  but	  rather,	  that	  literature	  on	  the	  RPS	  has	  not	  emphasized	  these	  other	  factors	  nor	  conceptualized	  their	  
importance	  in	  explaining	  the	  successful	  diffusion	  of	  the	  policy.	  
2	  The	  idea	  that	  policy	  makers	  are	  for	  sale,	  and	  that	  regulatory	  policy	  is	  largely	  purchased	  by	  industry	  interests	  is	  a	  
prevalent	  idea	  that	  has	  extended	  beyond	  regulatory	  scholarship	  to	  public	  opinion	  (Carpenter	  &	  Moss,	  2013).	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oversimplifying	  the	  reasons	  for	  policy	  outcomes,	  both	  these	  views	  create	  a	  dissonance	  of	  
understanding	  where	  policy	  outcomes	  are	  separated	  from	  the	  specific	  contexts	  that	  produced	  
them.	  	  
This	  thesis	  begins	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  genealogy	  is	  important.	  Its	  theoretical	  
framework	  is	  informed	  by	  Boyd’s	  work	  on	  genealogies	  of	  risk,	  in	  which	  he	  contends	  that	  
without	  looking	  at	  the	  genealogy	  of	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  risk	  emerged	  during	  a	  specific	  period	  in	  
U.S.	  history,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  comprehend—among	  other	  things—the	  extent	  to	  which	  risk	  
assessment	  has	  been	  naturalized	  in	  contemporary	  discourse	  and	  multiple	  areas	  of	  regulation	  
(Boyd,	  2012).	  In	  a	  similar	  but	  more	  modest	  vein,	  this	  thesis	  claims	  that	  without	  proper	  
examination	  of	  genealogy,	  it	  is	  challenging	  to	  perceive	  the	  naturalized	  discourse	  made	  about	  
policy	  instruments	  that	  have	  a	  specific	  past.	  Without	  an	  understanding	  of	  a	  policy’s	  historical	  
context,	  we	  are	  limited	  in	  our	  ability	  to	  assess	  the	  reasons	  for	  successful	  policy	  adoption	  and	  
diffusion,	  or	  worse,	  draw	  misinformed	  conclusions.3	  More	  than	  an	  exercise	  of	  historical	  
excavation,	  this	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  illuminate	  different	  ways	  policy	  instruments	  and	  debates	  
about	  them	  are	  conceptualized,	  and	  how	  such	  narratives	  shape	  our	  thinking	  around	  how	  
policies	  become	  possible.	  	  
More	  specifically,	  this	  thesis	  aims	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  RPS	  emerged	  as	  a	  policy	  idea.	  
Despite	  its	  successful	  enactment	  in	  many	  states	  today,	  little	  mention	  is	  made	  in	  renewable	  
energy	  policy	  literature	  on	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  idea	  or	  how	  it	  initially	  failed	  in	  a	  geography	  that	  
appeared	  to	  exhibit	  favorable	  conditions	  for	  its	  adoption.	  This	  thesis	  elucidates	  the	  debate	  for	  
promoting	  renewable	  energy	  generation	  during	  the	  California	  retail	  electricity	  restructuring	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  discussion	  in	  section	  6.2.	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process	  by	  examining:	  what	  policy	  instruments	  were	  proposed;	  the	  stakeholders	  that	  supported	  
each;	  where	  these	  policy	  ideas	  came	  from;	  how	  they	  gained	  traction;	  which	  instrument	  was	  
eventually	  chosen;	  and	  what	  compromises	  were	  made	  in	  doing	  so.	  This	  thesis	  asserts	  that	  
despite	  attempts	  in	  energy	  policy	  to	  speak	  about	  policy	  instruments	  in	  technocratic	  ways,	  a	  
debate	  about	  policy	  choices	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  actors	  and	  institutions	  that	  propose,	  
evaluate,	  and	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  outcomes	  of	  such	  instruments.	  It	  shows	  how	  understanding	  
the	  rich	  political	  economy	  from	  which	  the	  RPS	  emerged	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  policy’s	  eventual	  
success	  across	  the	  U.S.—despite	  its	  initial	  loss	  to	  another	  policy	  instrument	  in	  California.	  	  
Lastly,	  it’s	  important	  to	  note	  this	  examination	  focuses	  on	  the	  process	  of	  how	  the	  RPS	  
gained	  traction	  initially	  as	  a	  policy	  instrument—implementation	  and	  modifications	  to	  the	  policy	  
after	  state	  enactments	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  latter	  areas	  are	  also	  important	  
elements	  that	  help	  explain	  the	  success	  of	  RPS	  policies	  and	  warrant	  careful	  study.	  They	  have	  
received	  some	  attention	  in	  the	  current	  RPS	  literature.4	  	  
Chapter	  2	  gives	  a	  broad	  overview	  of	  the	  RPS,	  how	  it	  works,	  and	  the	  diffusion	  of	  state	  
RPS	  policies	  today.	  The	  chapter	  also	  reviews	  current	  literature	  on	  renewable	  energy	  policy	  
generally	  and	  the	  RPS	  in	  particular.	  The	  last	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  explains	  why	  California	  provides	  
an	  interesting	  case	  study	  for	  the	  RPS.	  
Chapter	  3	  provides	  historical	  background	  on	  the	  development	  of	  electricity	  restructuring	  
in	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  what	  it	  meant	  for	  a	  rising	  renewable	  energy	  industry.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  
chapter	  reviews	  key	  federal	  statutes	  that	  opened	  the	  wholesale	  electricity	  market	  to	  
competition	  and	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  states	  to	  experiment	  with	  restructuring	  at	  the	  retail	  level.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See,	  e.g.,	  Wiser	  and	  Langniss,	  2003;	  Hurlbut,	  2008;	  Rabe,	  2006;	  Leon,	  2013.	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second	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  restructuring	  in	  California	  as	  it	  related	  to	  renewables	  
policy	  contentions.	  It	  first	  explains	  how	  deregulation5	  necessitated	  the	  development	  of	  the	  RPS	  
as	  a	  renewables	  policy	  instrument,	  and	  then	  reviews	  other	  instruments	  that	  were	  chosen	  to	  
support	  renewables	  at	  different	  key	  moments	  during	  the	  1994-­‐1996	  restructuring	  process.	  
Two	  policy	  instruments	  became	  the	  main	  contenders	  for	  supporting	  renewables	  
development	  in	  California:	  the	  RPS	  and	  a	  surcharge	  fund.	  Chapter	  4	  elucidates	  the	  two	  
separate,	  but	  intertwined	  debates	  on	  the	  policy	  instruments:	  a	  policy	  instrument	  debate	  and	  a	  
political	  economy	  debate.	  It	  contests	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  both	  debates	  to	  
understand	  the	  complex	  environment	  from	  which	  a	  policy	  instrument	  emerges.	  The	  chapter	  
pushes	  back	  on	  the	  pervasive	  tendency	  in	  the	  policy	  realm	  to	  speak	  about	  policy	  instrument	  
debates	  as	  though	  they	  are	  separate	  from	  the	  contexts	  that	  produced	  them.	  It	  shows	  that	  while	  
the	  technocratic	  aspects	  of	  policy	  instruments	  is	  easier	  to	  parse,	  it	  is	  disadvantageous,	  even	  
dangerous,	  to	  leave	  the	  political	  economy	  debate	  unacknowledged—because	  these	  
contestations	  often	  have	  far	  greater	  influence	  on	  policy	  outcomes.	  Chapter	  4	  also	  uses	  the	  
political	  economy	  lens	  to	  illuminate	  moments	  of	  contingency	  during	  the	  deliberation	  process.	  
The	  contingencies	  of	  policy	  making	  help	  us	  to	  critically	  understand	  how	  the	  interaction	  of	  
regulatory	  reform,	  divergent	  stakeholder	  interests,	  the	  political	  dynamics	  of	  the	  environmental	  
left,	  and	  different	  institutional	  structures	  and	  objectives	  allowed	  a	  novel	  policy	  idea,	  the	  RPS,	  to	  
take	  hold.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  In	  this	  thesis,	  the	  terms	  “restructuring”	  and	  “deregulation”	  are	  used	  interchangeably	  to	  mean	  the	  process	  of	  
removing	  or	  reducing	  state	  regulations.	  “Restructuring”	  is	  a	  more	  accurate	  term	  for	  the	  process	  since	  government	  
oversight	  still	  exists	  in	  a	  market	  environment,	  even	  if	  its	  role	  has	  changed. 
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Chapter	  5	  reviews	  the	  successful	  case	  of	  RPS	  adoption	  in	  Texas	  to	  provide	  a	  useful	  
contrast	  to	  the	  California	  case	  study.	  Though	  the	  state’s	  unique	  political	  and	  historical	  
circumstances	  didn’t	  seem	  to	  indicate	  favorable	  conditions	  for	  a	  socially	  progressive	  renewable	  
energy	  mandate,	  the	  RPS	  passed	  as	  part	  of	  the	  state’s	  restructuring	  bill	  with	  broad	  political	  
support.	  A	  political	  economy	  lens	  again	  illuminates	  the	  unique	  context	  that	  brought	  about	  such	  
a	  policy	  outcome.	  
Finally,	  Chapter	  6	  offers	  conclusions	  about	  why	  it’s	  important	  to	  understand	  both	  the	  
policy	  instrument	  and	  political	  economy	  dimensions	  of	  a	  policy	  debate.	  Comparing	  the	  
California	  case	  study	  with	  that	  of	  Texas,	  the	  section	  provides	  some	  lessons	  learned	  specific	  to	  
policy	  entrepreneurship.	  It	  concludes	  with	  three	  broader	  insights	  about	  the	  importance	  of	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2 THE	  RENEWABLE	  PORTFOLIO	  STANDARD	  
	  
An	  RPS,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  renewable	  energy	  standard	  (RES),	  is	  a	  statutory	  requirement	  
to	  achieve	  a	  renewable	  energy	  target	  by	  a	  certain	  date.	  State	  RPSs	  require	  retail	  electricity	  
suppliers	  to	  provide	  an	  explicit	  percentage	  or	  quantity	  of	  their	  electricity	  from	  qualifying	  
renewables	  technologies.	  The	  requirements	  can	  apply	  to	  all	  suppliers	  in	  a	  jurisdiction,	  or	  a	  
specific	  segment	  (e.g.,	  IOUs).	  Qualifying	  technologies	  usually	  include	  wind,	  solar,	  geothermal,	  
biomass,	  and	  some	  types	  of	  hydroelectricity,	  but	  may	  also	  include	  resources	  like	  landfill	  gas,	  
municipal	  solid	  waste,	  and	  tidal	  energy.	  A	  state	  can	  additionally	  promote	  the	  growth	  of	  a	  
particular	  technology	  by	  providing	  provision	  targets	  specific	  to	  that	  technology	  (e.g.,	  solar	  or	  
biomass);	  this	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “set	  aside”	  or	  “carve	  out”.	  A	  state	  may	  have	  many	  
reasons	  for	  such	  provisions,	  including	  taking	  advantage	  of	  a	  state’s	  resource	  base,	  catering	  to	  
local	  preferences,	  or	  preferential	  treatment	  to	  special	  interests	  (Rabe,	  2006).6	  	  
Despite	  the	  myriad	  of	  state	  RPS	  models,	  a	  salient	  feature	  of	  the	  policy	  is	  renewable	  
energy	  credits	  (RECs).	  A	  REC	  represents	  and	  accounts	  for	  the	  “renewable	  attributes”7	  of	  
renewable	  generation,	  thus	  allowing	  the	  physical	  electricity	  generated	  to	  feed	  into	  the	  
electricity	  grid	  without	  further	  tracking.	  Because	  RECs	  provide	  an	  accurate,	  durable	  record	  of	  
the	  renewable	  energy	  produced,	  they	  are	  used	  by	  regulators	  to	  track	  RPS	  compliance	  and	  by	  
electricity	  providers—those	  seeking	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  standard—as	  a	  fungible	  commodity.	  A	  
producer	  who	  generates	  renewable	  electricity	  in	  excess	  of	  its	  own	  RPS	  obligation	  may	  trade	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  It’s	  important	  to	  note	  the	  use	  of	  preferential	  provisions	  has	  increased	  with	  the	  diffusion	  of	  RPS	  adoption;	  in	  its	  
original	  design,	  the	  RPS	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  technology	  neutral,	  meaning	  it	  would	  not	  favor	  any	  particular	  renewable	  
source,	  deferring	  to	  the	  market	  to	  determine	  the	  most	  cost-­‐competitive	  renewables	  technology.	  
7	  Such	  attributes	  can	  include	  mitigation	  of	  finite	  fossil	  fuel	  extraction,	  environmental	  pollution	  and	  degradation,	  
and	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions.	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sell	  additional	  RECs	  to	  other	  suppliers	  who	  may	  not	  have	  enough	  renewable	  electricity	  to	  meet	  
their	  requirement.	  It’s	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  markets	  for	  RECs	  and	  for	  the	  sale	  of	  electric	  
power	  are	  separate	  because	  the	  RECs	  market	  represents	  the	  cost	  of	  renewable	  energy	  above	  
the	  market	  cost	  of	  (conventionally-­‐generated)	  electricity.	  Thus,	  the	  RPS	  is	  a	  command-­‐and-­‐
control	  policy	  that	  guarantees	  a	  specific	  level	  of	  support	  for	  renewables	  technologies,	  
supported	  by	  a	  market-­‐based	  RECs	  mechanism	  that	  allows	  suppliers	  to	  meet	  compliance	  in	  the	  
most	  cost-­‐effective	  way.	  
	  
2.1 The	  RPS	  Today	  
Since	  the	  first	  adoptions	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  RPS	  has	  emerged	  as	  an	  important	  driver	  
for	  renewable	  energy	  capacity	  in	  the	  U.S.8	  The	  policy	  has	  proliferated	  at	  the	  state	  level,	  with	  
mandatory	  programs	  today	  in	  29	  states,	  two	  territories,	  and	  Washington	  D.C.	  Another	  eight	  
states	  and	  two	  territories	  have	  non-­‐enforceable	  renewable	  portfolio	  goals.	  Figure	  1	  shows	  the	  
varying	  levels	  of	  RPS	  requirements	  in	  U.S.	  states	  (Database	  of	  State	  Incentives	  for	  Renewables	  
and	  Efficiency	  [DSIRE],	  2014a).9	  RPS	  requirements	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	  
energy	  portfolio	  (e.g.,	  Colorado),	  as	  additional	  energy	  capacity	  (e.g.,	  Texas),	  or	  a	  mix	  of	  both	  
(e.g.,	  Michigan).	  Although	  no	  new	  state	  RPS	  policies	  have	  passed	  since	  2009,	  in	  the	  past	  few	  
years,	  a	  number	  of	  states	  have	  strengthened	  previously	  established	  RPS	  programs.	  In	  2013,	  
there	  was	  a	  concerted	  effort	  by	  conservative	  political	  groups	  to	  weaken	  RPS	  programs,	  
although	  these	  attempts	  have	  not	  thus	  far—with	  few	  exceptions—led	  to	  meaningful	  changes	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  State	  RPSs,	  along	  with	  federal	  tax	  incentives,	  have	  been	  the	  strongest	  drivers	  of	  renewable	  energy	  development.	  
The	  RPS	  creates	  demand	  for	  renewable	  energy,	  while	  federal	  credits	  and	  grants	  reduce	  the	  cost	  of	  project	  
development,	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  supply	  of	  renewable	  energy	  (Warren,	  2013).	  
9	  This	  graphic	  is	  available	  at:	  http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pptx.	  It	  is	  reprinted	  
here	  courtesy	  of	  DSIRE.	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existing	  RPS	  policies.	  In	  aggregate,	  existing	  state	  RPS	  programs	  are	  estimated	  to	  require	  roughly	  
110	  GW	  of	  renewable	  capacity	  by	  2035.	  This	  includes	  95	  GW	  of	  new	  facilities	  beyond	  what	  each	  
RPS	  state	  already	  had	  at	  the	  time	  that	  it	  enacted	  the	  policy	  (Wiser	  &	  Bolinger,	  2012).	  The	  	  
Figure	  1:	  Renewable	  Portfolio	  Standards	  and	  Goals	  
	  
additional	  renewable	  capacity	  is	  equivalent	  to	  roughly	  32%	  of	  projected	  load	  growth	  between	  
2000	  and	  2035—meaning	  that	  facilities	  that	  have	  been	  built	  as	  a	  result	  of	  RPS	  mandates	  meet	  
one-­‐third	  of	  the	  country’s	  growing	  energy	  demands.	  	  
	  
2.2 Understanding	  How	  States	  Adopt	  the	  RPS	  
Many	  renewables	  policy	  scholars	  today	  claim	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  RPS	  makes	  sense	  
because	  it	  is	  a	  transparent	  and	  relatively	  simple	  policy	  option,	  involves	  an	  incremental	  
expansion	  of	  existing	  regulatory	  powers	  over	  the	  electricity	  industry,	  and	  appeals	  to	  a	  diverse	  
set	  of	  stakeholders	  (Golden,	  2003;	  Komor,	  2004;	  Rabe,	  2006).	  As	  a	  policy	  option,	  the	  RPS	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ensures	  the	  certainty	  of	  an	  explicit	  goal	  while	  allowing	  the	  market	  to	  find	  the	  least	  expensive	  
way	  to	  achieve	  it.	  Scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  proliferation	  of	  state	  RPS	  policies	  and	  the	  decision	  in	  
many	  states	  to	  establish	  second-­‐generation	  policies	  (to	  increase	  the	  mandate	  level)	  illustrate	  
that	  the	  RPS	  tend	  to	  draw	  a	  fairly	  broad	  base	  of	  political	  support	  that	  often	  crosses	  partisan	  
lines.	  “It	  represents	  a	  blending	  of	  policy	  strategies	  with	  a	  combination	  of	  regulation	  and	  
deference	  to	  market	  preferences	  that	  is	  a	  hallmark	  of	  more	  recent	  innovations	  in	  American	  
environmental	  and	  energy	  policy”	  (Rabe,	  2006,	  p.	  3).	  
The	  above	  reasons	  for	  why	  states	  adopt	  an	  RPS	  provide	  limited	  explanation	  on	  how	  the	  
policy	  gained	  traction.	  In-­‐depth	  research	  on	  the	  latter	  has	  been	  very	  limited.	  Generally,	  RPS-­‐
related	  literature	  falls	  under	  one	  of	  the	  following	  categories:	  1)	  comparison	  of	  different	  policy	  
instruments	  (Dong,	  2012;	  Palmer,	  2011;	  Menanteau,	  2003;	  Bird	  et	  al,	  2001);	  2)	  evaluation	  of	  
the	  effectiveness	  of	  different	  policy	  regimes	  (Doris	  et	  al,	  2009;	  Menz	  and	  Vachon,	  2006);	  3)	  
assessments	  of	  policy	  experiences—usually	  the	  RPS	  (Wiser	  &	  Barbose,	  2008;	  Wiser	  et	  al,	  2007;	  
Wiser	  et	  al,	  2005;	  Langniss,	  2003;	  Leon,	  2013);	  4)	  modeling	  the	  impacts	  of	  various	  proposed	  
state-­‐	  and	  national-­‐level	  policies	  (Chen	  et	  al,	  2009;	  Sullivan	  et	  al,	  2009;	  Kydes,	  2007;	  Nogee	  et	  
al,	  2007;	  Carley,	  2007;	  Bernow	  et	  al,	  1997);	  and	  5)	  arguing	  for	  or	  against	  a	  federal	  RPS	  (Michaels	  
2008a;	  Michaels	  2008b;	  Cooper	  2008;	  Cooper	  and	  Sovacool,	  2008;	  Sovacool	  and	  Cooper,	  2007).	  	  
There	  have	  been	  a	  small	  group	  of	  scholars	  that	  have	  tried	  to	  explicate	  why	  states	  adopt	  
renewables	  policies	  by	  examining	  the	  factors	  influencing	  RPS	  adoption	  through	  regression	  
analysis.	  Such	  factors	  include	  variables	  such	  as	  gubernatorial	  and	  legislature	  political	  ideology,	  
education	  levels,	  population	  growth	  rate,	  gross	  state	  product,	  unemployment	  rate,	  citizen	  
ideology,	  the	  presence	  of	  different	  industries,	  conventional	  and	  renewable	  resource	  potential,	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and	  whether	  nearby	  states	  have	  adopted	  similar	  policies.	  However,	  among	  such	  studies,	  there	  
is	  little	  consensus	  on	  what	  variables	  strongly	  influence	  a	  state	  to	  choose	  the	  RPS.	  For	  example,	  
political	  ideology	  is	  consistently	  significant	  in	  predicting	  RPS	  adoption	  (Fowler	  and	  Breen,	  2013;	  
Lyon	  and	  Yin,	  2010;	  Chandler,	  2009;	  Huang	  et	  al,	  2007).	  Both	  the	  gross	  state	  product	  and	  the	  
state’s	  education	  level	  also	  seem	  significant,	  but	  each	  factor	  is	  only	  included	  in	  two	  of	  the	  
studies,	  making	  it	  challenging	  to	  draw	  any	  strong	  conclusions	  (Matisoff,	  2008;	  Huang	  et	  al,	  
2007;	  Menz	  and	  Vachon,	  2006).	  Most	  of	  the	  variables,	  however,	  are	  significant	  predictors	  of	  
adoption	  in	  some	  studies	  while	  not	  in	  others.	  These	  include	  population	  growth	  rate,	  income,	  
citizen	  ideology,	  renewable	  energy	  potential,	  the	  influence	  of	  conventional	  and	  renewable	  fuels	  
industries,	  and	  policy	  diffusion	  effects	  (Lyon	  and	  Yin,	  2010;	  Chandler,	  2009;	  Matisoff,	  2008;	  
Huang	  et	  al,	  2007;	  Menz	  and	  Vachon,	  2006).	  
Current	  statistical	  approaches	  appear	  limited	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  address	  the	  complexities	  
associated	  with	  the	  factors	  influencing	  RPS	  adoption.	  One	  challenge	  is	  that	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  
are	  latent	  variables	  for	  which	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  good	  proxy	  inputs	  (an	  example	  is	  measuring	  the	  
influence	  of	  industries).	  Even	  when	  the	  factor	  of	  interest	  can	  be	  well	  measured,	  different	  
studies	  use	  different	  data;	  for	  example,	  Chandler	  (2009)	  uses	  per	  capital	  disposable	  income,	  
Lyon	  and	  Yin	  (2010)	  uses	  the	  median	  income,	  and	  Menz	  and	  Vachon	  (2006)	  consolidates	  
median	  income	  with	  two	  other	  factors	  under	  a	  “social	  interest”	  variable.	  (Lyon	  and	  Yin	  do	  not	  
find	  the	  income	  variable	  significant	  while	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  other	  two	  studies	  do.)	  
Furthermore,	  while	  these	  analyses	  have	  found	  government	  ideology	  as	  the	  only	  consistently	  
significant	  predictor	  of	  RPS	  adoption,	  Rabe’s	  case	  studies	  of	  five	  RPS	  states	  indicate	  that	  
economic	  development	  is	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  driver	  of	  adoption	  (Rabe,	  2006).	  Anecdotal	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evidence	  also	  suggests	  there	  are	  dimensions	  influencing	  RPS	  adoption	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  
demonstrate	  via	  regression	  methods,	  such	  as	  complex	  negotiations	  between	  stakeholder	  
groups	  in	  some	  states	  or	  that	  adoption	  reasons	  have	  evolved	  over	  time.	  These	  incongruences	  
signal	  that	  statistical	  approaches	  are	  limited	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  explain	  the	  complex	  
environments	  from	  which	  state	  RPSs	  emerged,	  suggesting	  that	  adoptions	  may	  be	  better	  
understood	  as	  the	  result	  of	  how	  rather	  than	  a	  count-­‐off	  of	  why.	  
A	  few	  authors	  have	  addressed,	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  the	  politics	  influencing	  states	  to	  
adopt	  an	  RPS.	  Rabe	  (2006)	  peripherally	  examines	  some	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  factors	  
motivating	  RPS	  adoption	  in	  five	  case	  study	  states.10	  Hurlbut	  (2007)	  and	  Rabe	  (2004)	  elucidate	  
the	  politics	  shaping	  the	  restructuring	  legislation	  that	  created	  the	  Texas	  RPS,	  but	  neither	  
mentions	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  policy	  instrument.	  By	  focusing	  on	  instances	  of	  successful	  adoption,	  
these	  literatures	  maintain	  the	  image	  of	  the	  RPS	  as	  an	  immanent	  outcome	  and	  are	  unable	  to	  
fully	  explain	  how	  the	  RPS	  instrument	  came	  to	  be.	  
	  
2.3 The	  Case	  Study	  of	  the	  RPS	  in	  California	  
California	  provides	  an	  interesting	  case	  study	  for	  the	  RPS	  for	  several	  reasons:	  1)	  the	  state	  
has	  been	  a	  historical	  leader	  in	  supporting	  renewables	  development;	  2)	  the	  RPS	  was	  first	  
introduced	  in	  California,	  in	  large	  part	  because	  the	  state	  was	  undergoing	  electricity	  
restructuring;	  and	  3)	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  first	  two	  reasons,	  California	  seemed	  primed	  to	  be	  the	  
first	  state	  to	  adopt	  the	  policy,	  yet,	  California	  did	  not	  enact	  an	  RPS	  until	  2003.	  The	  initial	  failure	  
of	  the	  RPS	  in	  a	  state	  that	  a	  few	  years	  earlier	  had	  been	  a	  world	  leader	  in	  renewables	  generation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  The	  five	  case	  study	  states	  are	  Texas,	  Massachusetts,	  Nevada,	  Pennsylvania,	  and	  Colorado.	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shows	  its	  development	  as	  the	  policy	  of	  choice	  today	  was	  not	  an	  immanent	  outcome,	  but	  rather	  
the	  result	  of	  something	  more	  complex	  and	  contingent.	  
2.3.1 California’s	  Historical	  Leadership	  in	  Renewables	  Development	  
Since	  the	  1970s,	  California	  has	  often	  demonstrated	  itself	  as	  a	  national	  leader	  in	  
promoting	  nontraditional	  energy	  development.	  In	  1974,	  the	  state	  legislature	  created	  the	  
California	  Energy	  Commission	  (CEC);	  among	  other	  objectives,	  it	  was	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  primary	  
energy	  policy	  and	  planning	  agency	  responsible	  for	  sponsoring	  research	  and	  development	  of	  
renewable	  energy	  technologies.11	  Two	  years	  later,	  in	  September	  1976,	  California	  passed	  the	  
Small	  Power	  Producers	  Act	  that	  aimed	  to	  encourage	  the	  growth	  of	  nontraditional	  power	  
producers	  by	  relieving	  them	  from	  state	  regulatory	  oversight	  (Hirsh,	  1999).	  After	  Congress	  
passed	  the	  Public	  Utility	  Regulatory	  Policies	  Act	  (PURPA)	  in	  October	  1978,	  progressive	  California	  
policy	  makers	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  leveraging	  the	  Act	  to	  develop	  a	  commercial	  market	  
for	  renewable	  energy	  technologies	  (Swisher	  &	  Porter,	  2006).	  Passed	  as	  part	  of	  the	  National	  
Energy	  Act,	  PURPA	  established	  the	  foundations	  for	  the	  independent	  power	  movement,	  which	  
included	  renewable	  generation.	  (Golden,	  2003;	  Hirsh,	  1999).	  It	  removed	  barriers	  long	  
established	  by	  monopoly	  control	  of	  energy	  markets	  by	  requiring	  electric	  utilities	  to	  purchase	  
power	  from	  qualifying	  small	  renewable	  or	  cogeneration	  facilities	  at	  “avoided	  cost”12	  (Hirsh,	  
1999,	  p.	  87).	  The	  Federal	  Energy	  Regulatory	  Commission	  (FERC)	  issued	  PURPA’s	  implementing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  The	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  California	  Energy	  Commission	  include:	  forecasting	  future	  energy	  needs,	  promoting	  
energy	  efficiency	  and	  conservation	  by	  setting	  standards,	  supporting	  public	  interest	  energy	  research,	  developing	  
renewable	  energy	  technologies,	  and	  licensing	  power	  plants	  above	  50	  MW,	  and	  planning	  for	  and	  directing	  response	  
to	  energy	  emergencies.	  For	  more	  information,	  refer	  to	  http://www.energy.ca.gov/commission.	  
12	  Under	  18	  C.F.R.	  §	  292.101(b)(6)(1994),	  the	  “avoided	  cost”	  is	  defined	  as	  “the	  incremental	  costs	  to	  an	  electric	  
utility	  of	  electric	  energy	  or	  capacity,	  or	  both,	  which,	  but	  for	  the	  purchase	  from	  the	  qualifying	  facility	  or	  qualifying	  
facilities,	  such	  utility	  would	  generate	  itself	  or	  purchase	  from	  another	  source”.	  Essentially,	  this	  is	  the	  marginal	  cost	  
for	  utilities	  to	  acquire	  an	  additional	  unit	  of	  power. 
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regulations	  and	  delegated	  states	  to	  set	  the	  avoided	  costs.	  California	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
progressive	  states	  in	  requiring	  electric	  utilities	  to	  provide	  generous	  standard	  offer	  contracts	  
(Rader	  &	  Short,	  1998).	  Of	  the	  four	  contracts	  offered	  at	  standard	  terms	  and	  conditions,	  the	  most	  
significant	  to	  renewable	  energy	  generators	  was	  the	  Interim	  Standard	  Offer	  #4	  (ISO	  4),	  a	  30-­‐year	  
contract	  with	  a	  capacity	  payment	  and	  fixed	  energy	  prices	  for	  the	  first	  10	  years	  (Swisher	  &	  
Porter,	  2006,	  p.	  186).	  Payments	  for	  the	  first	  10	  years	  were	  based	  on	  projections	  of	  future	  oil	  
prices,	  which,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  1970s	  oil	  crises,	  were	  expected	  to	  be	  high.	  These	  generous	  
contracts	  allowed	  wind	  development	  to	  increase	  in	  California	  from	  10	  megawatts	  (MW)	  in	  1981	  
to	  1700	  MW	  by	  the	  early	  1990s	  (Swisher	  &	  Porter,	  2006;	  American	  Wind	  Energy	  Association	  
[AWEA],	  2003).	  This	  led	  to	  a	  brief	  period	  when	  California	  had	  the	  most	  installed	  wind	  capacity	  
in	  the	  world.	  
2.3.2 Introduction	  of	  the	  RPS	  in	  California	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  exponential	  growth	  of	  renewables—largely,	  wind	  technology—during	  
the	  1980s	  through	  early	  1990s,	  the	  renewables	  community	  became	  concerned	  about	  
maintaining	  their	  market	  share	  as	  California	  contemplated	  restructuring	  in	  1993.	  To	  ensure	  a	  
level	  of	  consistent	  support	  for	  renewable	  energy	  development,	  the	  American	  Wind	  Energy	  
Association	  (AWEA)	  and	  Union	  of	  Concerned	  Scientists	  (UCS)	  first	  introduced	  the	  RPS	  during	  the	  
California	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  (CPUC)	  restructuring	  proceedings.13	  In	  April	  1994,	  the	  
CPUC	  issued	  a	  landmark	  notice	  of	  rulemaking	  that	  became	  know	  as	  the	  "Blue	  Book”,	  proposing	  
to	  restructure	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  state’s	  electric	  utilities	  to	  allow	  more	  competition.	  There	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  California	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  is	  a	  state	  agency	  that	  regulates	  privately-­‐owned	  utility	  companies,	  
including	  electric	  utilities.	  The	  CPUC	  aims	  to	  serve	  the	  public	  interest	  by	  protecting	  consumers	  and	  ensuring	  the	  
provision	  of	  safe,	  reliable	  utility	  service	  and	  infrastructure	  at	  reasonable	  rates.	  For	  more	  information,	  refer	  to	  
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/puc/.	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was	  political	  controversy	  around	  how	  major	  public	  policy	  objectives	  would	  be	  sustained	  in	  the	  
new	  competitive	  environment,	  including	  renewable	  energy.	  Aside	  from	  the	  RPS,	  two	  other	  
policy	  instruments	  were	  also	  considered	  to	  promote	  renewables:	  a	  green	  power	  market	  and	  a	  
non-­‐bypassable	  surcharge	  fund.	  The	  RPS	  and	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  eventually	  emerged	  as	  the	  
dominant	  policy	  contenders	  in	  the	  renewables	  debate.	  	  
At	  the	  time,	  the	  RPS	  was	  a	  novel	  policy	  idea.	  It	  was	  developed	  by	  Nancy	  Rader	  of	  AWEA,	  
and	  brought	  forth	  collaboratively	  with	  Donald	  Aitken	  of	  UCS,	  after	  months	  of	  exchange	  with	  
other	  renewable	  energy	  advocates	  (Swisher	  and	  Porter,	  2006;	  N.	  Rader,	  personal	  
communication,	  April	  14,	  2014).	  The	  RPS	  was	  presented	  as	  the	  policy	  instrument	  that	  would	  be	  
the	  most	  compatible	  with	  a	  market	  environment	  because	  it	  incorporated	  a	  tradable	  RECs	  
feature	  to	  allow	  participants	  to	  find	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  way	  to	  meet	  compliance.	  
Additionally,	  RPS	  advocates	  argued	  it	  would	  provide	  the	  certainty	  of	  a	  long-­‐term,	  predictable	  
market	  for	  renewables	  that	  would	  drive	  down	  the	  costs	  of	  these	  technologies	  through	  
competition,	  efficiency,	  and	  innovation	  (AWEA,	  1997).	  These	  arguments	  resonated	  with	  CPUC	  
regulators	  and	  in	  its	  December	  1995	  restructuring	  order,	  the	  agency	  supported	  the	  concept	  of	  
an	  RPS	  (California	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  [CPUC],	  1995c).	  
2.3.3 Loss	  of	  the	  RPS	  in	  California	  
In	  early	  1996,	  California	  seemed	  primed	  to	  be	  the	  first	  state	  to	  adopt	  the	  RPS.14	  After	  its	  
December	  1995	  decision,	  the	  CPUC	  directed	  affected	  stakeholders	  to	  form	  a	  working	  group	  to	  
provide	  recommendations	  on	  RPS	  implementation	  details	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1996).	  The	  group’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Iowa	  adopted	  an	  RPS-­‐like	  mechanism	  in	  1983,	  which	  was	  revised	  in	  1991.	  The	  Alternative	  Energy	  Law	  requires	  its	  
two	  IOUs	  to	  acquire	  105	  MW	  of	  renewable	  energy	  capacity	  (DSIRE,	  2014b).	  Current	  state	  RPSs	  are	  modeled	  more	  
closely	  on	  the	  RPS	  proposal	  introduced	  in	  California,	  which	  includes	  a	  RECs	  trading	  mechanism.	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report,	  filed	  on	  August	  23,	  1996,	  contained	  six	  different	  comprehensive	  proposals,	  signaling	  
that	  stakeholders	  could	  not	  come	  to	  a	  consensus	  on	  one	  renewable	  policy	  instrument.	  Five	  of	  
the	  proposals	  were	  variations	  of	  the	  RPS	  approach	  and	  the	  sixth	  proposal	  supported	  a	  
surcharge	  fund	  approach.	  A	  few	  days	  later,	  on	  August	  31,	  the	  California	  legislature	  passed	  
Assembly	  Bill	  1890	  (AB	  1890),	  the	  state’s	  restructuring	  bill.	  Though	  AB	  1890	  retained	  many	  of	  
the	  CPUC’s	  restructuring	  recommendations,	  the	  legislature	  departed	  from	  the	  agency’s	  choice	  
of	  an	  RPS	  and	  elected	  to	  promote	  renewables	  through	  a	  non-­‐bypassable	  surcharge	  fund	  
(California	  Assembly	  Bill	  1890	  [CA	  AB	  1890],	  1996).	  	  The	  stakeholder	  contestations	  that	  had	  
played	  out	  in	  the	  CPUC	  working	  group	  had	  also	  taken	  place	  during	  the	  legislature’s	  conference	  
committee	  hearings.15	  And	  the	  resulting	  institutional	  decisions	  were	  very	  different.	  California	  
enacted	  an	  RPS	  in	  2003,	  after	  the	  electricity	  crisis	  of	  2000	  and	  2001.	  Many	  believed	  that	  
diversification	  of	  the	  energy	  supply	  was	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  another	  energy	  disaster.	  The	  
electricity	  industry	  had	  overinvested	  in	  natural	  gas	  plants	  and	  the	  manipulation	  of	  gas	  markets	  
had	  contributed	  to	  the	  crisis.16	  
The	  contingent	  circumstances	  that	  led	  the	  legislature	  to	  adopt	  a	  surcharge	  fund	  instead	  
of	  the	  RPS	  beckons	  a	  deeper	  elucidation	  of	  how	  this	  happened.	  Electricity	  restructuring	  both	  
engendered	  the	  renewables	  policy	  debate	  and	  provided	  the	  particular	  framework	  in	  which	  it	  
took	  place.	  To	  better	  understand	  what	  restructuring	  meant	  for	  the	  renewables,	  it	  is	  important	  
to	  first	  understand	  the	  history	  of	  the	  electricity	  sector	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  why	  restructuring	  happened	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  A	  legislative	  conference	  committee	  is	  a	  committee	  appointed	  by	  the	  two	  houses	  to	  resolve	  disagreements	  on	  a	  
particular	  bill.	  In	  California,	  it	  was	  common	  to	  appoint	  a	  conference	  committee	  to	  work	  out	  major	  bills	  that	  
involved	  many	  stakeholders.	  Theoretically,	  committee	  hearings	  provided	  a	  more	  public	  way	  for	  different	  interests	  
to	  voice	  and	  negotiate	  their	  interests.	  
16	  See,	  e.g.,	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  2002.	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when	  it	  did,	  and	  what	  were	  the	  risks	  and	  opportunities	  that	  came	  with	  such	  a	  profound	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3 RESTRUCTURING	  	  
The	  utility	  consensus	  was	  a	  largely	  unchallenged	  agreement	  for	  over	  a	  century	  in	  the	  
U.S.	  that	  allowed	  IOUs	  to	  dominate	  the	  electric	  power	  industry.17	  The	  utility	  consensus	  was	  
based	  on	  the	  widespread	  belief	  that	  the	  electric	  power	  business	  constituted	  a	  natural	  
monopoly	  because	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  scope	  were	  required	  to	  drive	  down	  the	  price	  of	  
power	  (Hirsh,	  1999).18	  Therefore,	  a	  regulatory	  compact—one	  in	  which	  utilities	  provided	  
electricity	  customers	  abundant,	  reliable,	  universal	  service	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  right	  to	  operate	  
an	  exclusive,	  noncompetitive	  franchise—has	  long	  governed	  the	  industry.	  Utility	  managers	  and	  
state	  regulators	  built	  a	  comfortable	  consensus	  to	  use	  rate	  regulation	  under	  the	  compact	  to	  
produce	  a	  guaranteed	  return	  on	  large,	  bulky	  electricity	  investments	  at	  rates	  acceptable	  to	  
customers.	  	  
	  
3.1 Erosion	  of	  the	  Utility	  Consensus	  
Congress’	  enactment	  of	  PURPA	  in	  1978	  opened	  the	  market	  to	  independent	  power	  
producers	  and	  set	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  utility	  consensus	  in	  motion	  (Golden	  2003;	  Hirsh,	  1999).	  To	  
reduce	  dependence	  on	  foreign	  oil,	  diversify	  U.S.’s	  electricity	  sector,	  and	  promote	  alternative	  
energy	  sources	  and	  energy	  efficiency,	  section	  210	  of	  PURPA	  carved	  a	  potential	  space	  for	  new	  
classes	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  electric	  industry.	  Under	  section	  210,	  qualifying	  facilities	  (QFs)	  that	  
used	  renewables	  as	  a	  primary	  source	  or	  cogenerated	  heat	  and	  electricity	  were	  guaranteed	  a	  
market	  for	  power	  sales	  and	  exempted	  from	  the	  federal	  and	  state	  regulations	  that	  burdened	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Hirsh	  popularized	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  utility	  consensus	  in	  Power	  loss:	  The	  origins	  of	  deregulation	  and	  
restructuring	  in	  the	  American	  electric	  utility	  system	  (Hirsh,	  1999).	  
18	  Historically,	  the	  electricity	  system	  required	  vast	  and	  bulky	  investments	  in	  energy	  generation	  and	  transmission.	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electric	  utility	  companies.19	  While	  FERC	  certified	  facilities	  for	  QF	  status,	  it	  delegated	  many	  
implementation	  details	  to	  the	  states,	  including	  the	  setting	  of	  avoided	  costs.	  As	  a	  result,	  
California	  regulators	  were	  able	  to	  guide	  the	  creation	  of	  standardized	  contracts	  that	  required	  
utilities	  to	  pay	  QFs	  generously	  for	  their	  power.	  The	  contracts	  provided	  non-­‐utility	  developers,	  
who	  did	  not	  have	  rate	  regulation	  to	  guarantee	  a	  return	  on	  investment,	  the	  long-­‐term	  price	  
certainty	  needed	  to	  obtain	  financing	  for	  capital-­‐intensive	  renewable	  energy	  projects	  (Swisher	  
and	  Porter,	  2006).	  California	  embraced	  the	  federal	  statute	  in	  particular	  because	  its	  utilities	  had	  
fallen	  behind	  in	  building	  new	  power	  plants	  and	  electricity	  demand	  continued	  to	  rise	  (Hirsh,	  
1999).	  By	  1991,	  non-­‐utility	  generators	  produced	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  state’s	  energy	  (Hirsh,	  1999).	  
While	  PURPA	  energized	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  independent	  power	  sector,	  it	  had	  its	  limits.	  For	  one,	  
the	  statute	  only	  applied	  to	  a	  small	  group	  of	  renewables	  facilities	  with	  energy	  capacities	  of	  80	  
MW	  or	  less.	  Additionally,	  because	  the	  power	  sold	  by	  QFs	  to	  utilities	  were	  resold	  to	  electricity	  
customers,	  these	  transactions	  were	  considered	  wholesale	  power	  sales,	  which	  fell	  under	  FERC	  
jurisdiction.20	  So	  while	  states	  were	  given	  latitude	  in	  how	  they	  determined	  avoided	  costs,	  FERC	  
had	  the	  final	  authority	  to	  determine	  whether	  QF	  rates	  were	  “just	  and	  reasonable”.21	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Qualifying	  facilities	  fall	  into	  two	  categories:	  small	  power	  production	  facilities	  and	  cogeneration	  facilities.	  “A	  small	  
power	  production	  facility	  is	  a	  generating	  facility	  of	  80	  MW	  or	  less	  whose	  primary	  energy	  source	  is	  renewable	  
(hydro,	  wind	  or	  solar),	  biomass,	  waste,	  or	  geothermal	  resources.	  There	  are	  some	  limited	  exceptions	  to	  the	  80	  MW	  
size	  limit	  that	  apply	  to	  certain	  facilities	  certified	  prior	  to	  1995	  and	  designated	  under	  section	  3(17)(E)	  of	  the	  Federal	  
Power	  Act	  (16	  U.S.C.	  §	  796(17)(E)),	  which	  have	  no	  size	  limitation.	  A	  cogeneration	  facility	  is	  a	  generating	  facility	  that	  
sequentially	  produces	  electricity	  and	  another	  form	  of	  useful	  thermal	  energy	  (such	  as	  heat	  or	  steam)	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  
more	  efficient	  than	  the	  separate	  production	  of	  both	  forms	  of	  energy	  ...	  There	  is	  no	  size	  limitation	  for	  qualifying	  
cogeneration	  facilities.”	  For	  more	  information,	  refer	  to	  https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-­‐info/qual-­‐
fac/what-­‐is.asp.	  
20	  The	  Federal	  Power	  Act	  of	  1935	  (FPA)	  gave	  FERC	  (then	  the	  Federal	  Power	  Commission)	  regulatory	  jurisdiction	  
over	  all	  transmission	  and	  wholesale	  sales	  of	  electric	  energy	  in	  interstate	  commerce.	  Under	  16	  U.S.C.	  §	  824(d),	  a	  
wholesale	  sale	  of	  electric	  energy	  is	  defined	  as	  “a	  sale	  of	  electric	  energy	  to	  any	  person	  for	  resale”.	  	  
21	  Under	  16	  U.S.C	  §	  824d(a),	  FERC	  needs	  to	  ensure	  that	  rates	  are	  “just	  and	  reasonable”.	  In	  the	  broadest	  sense,	  this	  
is	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  that	  the	  agency	  should	  ensure	  that	  the	  rate	  is	  fair	  and	  not	  discriminatory	  to	  either	  party.	  To	  
further	  understand	  interpretations	  of	  “just	  and	  reasonable”,	  see	  in	  particular	  Federal	  Power	  Commission	  v.	  Hope	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The	  following	  year,	  the	  Energy	  Policy	  Act	  of	  1992	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  deregulation.	  
Among	  other	  provisions,	  the	  Act	  facilitated	  the	  development	  of	  wholesale	  competitive	  markets	  
by	  eliminating	  utility	  regulations	  on	  a	  larger	  class	  of	  independent	  power	  producers	  and	  allowing	  
them	  to	  use	  utility-­‐owned	  transmission	  infrastructure	  (Energy	  Policy	  Act	  of	  1992).	  Independent	  
generators	  beyond	  those	  that	  qualified	  as	  QFs	  were	  exempted	  from	  the	  regulatory	  and	  
reporting	  provisions	  of	  the	  Public	  Holding	  Company	  Act	  of	  1935,	  allowing	  them	  to	  compete	  
with	  larger	  IOUs	  in	  the	  electricity	  generation	  market.22	  As	  well,	  the	  Act	  clarified	  and	  expanded,	  
under	  Federal	  Power	  Act	  sections	  210	  and	  211,	  FERC’s	  authority	  to	  order	  regulated	  utilities	  to	  
provide	  transmission	  access	  to	  non-­‐utility	  companies	  at	  just	  and	  reasonable	  rates.	  The	  law’s	  
mandates	  only	  applied	  to	  sales	  and	  transmission	  of	  electricity	  at	  the	  wholesale	  level,	  however,	  
it	  gave	  states	  the	  option	  to	  authorize	  open	  access	  of	  the	  power	  grid	  at	  the	  distribution	  level,	  
thereby	  making	  way	  for	  state	  experimentations	  of	  implementing	  competitive	  retail	  markets	  
(Hirsh,	  1999).	  	  
3.1.1 Electricity	  Restructuring	  at	  the	  Wholesale	  Level	  
While	  FERC	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  order	  wholesale	  “wheeling”—moving	  electricity	  over	  
transmission	  lines—under	  the	  Energy	  Policy	  Act	  of	  1992,	  it	  could	  only	  do	  so	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  
basis.	  In	  April	  1996,	  FERC	  issued	  the	  landmark	  Order	  No.	  888	  to	  encourage	  wholesale	  electricity	  
competition	  by	  making	  access	  to	  the	  transmission	  grid	  open	  and	  non-­‐discriminatory	  (FERC,	  
1996).23	  Traditionally,	  the	  electricity	  industry	  had	  been	  dominated	  by	  vertically-­‐integrated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Natural	  Gas	  Co.,	  320	  U.S.	  591	  (1994)	  and	  Bluefield	  Water	  Works	  &	  Improvement	  Co.	  v.	  Public	  Service	  Commission,	  
262	  U.S.	  679	  (1923),	  all	  of	  which	  are	  rate	  regulation	  cases.	  	  	  
22	  This	  new	  class	  of	  power	  producers	  is	  known	  as	  exempt	  wholesale	  generators.	  
23	  FERC	  did	  so	  by	  citing	  its	  duty	  under	  the	  Federal	  Power	  Act	  sections	  205	  and	  206	  to	  eliminate	  undue	  
discrimination.	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utilities	  that	  owned	  the	  generators,	  transmission	  lines,	  and	  distribution	  systems	  required	  to	  
produce	  and	  transport	  electricity.	  Under	  this	  system,	  utilities	  could	  restrict	  access	  to	  their	  
private	  transmission	  grids	  and	  favor	  the	  delivery	  of	  their	  own	  power	  to	  customers.	  Order	  No.	  
888	  required	  all	  public	  utilities	  that	  controlled	  interstate	  transmission	  lines	  and	  facilities	  to	  file	  a	  
non-­‐discriminatory,	  open	  access	  transmission	  tariff	  (OATT)	  with	  FERC	  so	  that	  anyone	  can	  use	  
the	  transmission	  infrastructure	  under	  OATT	  terms,	  rates,	  and	  conditions	  (FERC,	  1996).	  To	  
ensure	  that	  open	  access	  transmission	  would	  be	  non-­‐discriminatory,	  the	  Order	  also	  required	  
“functional	  unbundling”	  of	  utilities’	  generation	  and	  transmission	  operations	  to	  avoid	  anti-­‐
competitive	  behavior—thus,	  a	  utility’s	  generation	  service	  would	  also	  have	  to	  access	  the	  OATT	  
to	  use	  its	  own	  transmission	  service	  (FERC,	  1996).24	  	  Order	  No.	  888	  also	  allowed	  utilities	  
providing	  open	  access	  transmission	  to	  recover	  “legitimate,	  prudent	  and	  verifiable”	  stranded	  
costs	  from	  electricity	  customers	  for	  investments	  they	  made	  under	  previous	  regulation	  (FERC,	  
1996).	  The	  electricity	  restructuring	  movement	  that	  was	  happening	  at	  the	  wholesale	  level	  in	  
many	  ways	  provided	  impetus	  for	  California’s	  restructuring	  at	  the	  retail	  level.	  
3.1.2 California’s	  Seminal	  Yellow	  and	  Blue	  Books	  
In	  1992,	  the	  forthcoming	  Energy	  Policy	  Act,	  along	  with	  deregulation	  in	  
telecommunications	  and	  natural	  gas	  industries	  just	  a	  few	  years	  earlier,	  motivated	  the	  CPUC	  to	  
examine	  restructuring	  opportunities	  (CPUC,	  1993).	  The	  Commission	  asked	  their	  Division	  of	  
Strategic	  Planning	  to	  report	  on	  the	  "conditions	  the	  electric	  industry	  currently	  confronts,	  as	  well	  
as	  future	  trends	  likely	  to	  influence	  the	  industry”	  (CPUC,	  1992,	  p.	  17).	  Pete	  Wilson,	  the	  
Republican	  governor	  of	  California	  at	  the	  time,	  had	  appointed	  a	  largely	  conservative	  five-­‐person	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Functional	  unbundling	  did	  not	  require	  utilities	  to	  sell	  their	  generation	  or	  transmission	  assets	  to	  a	  non-­‐affiliate.	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Commission,	  with	  Daniel	  Fessler	  serving	  as	  its	  president.	  Most	  of	  the	  commissioners	  subscribed	  
strongly	  to	  extreme	  free	  market	  principles	  and	  were	  eager	  to	  use	  the	  competitive	  market	  to	  
drive	  down	  electricity	  prices	  (K.	  Lipper,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  2,	  2014;	  Hirsh,	  1999).	  
Additionally,	  the	  CPUC	  found	  itself	  progressively	  engaging	  in	  more	  and	  more	  “complex	  
administrative	  proceedings”	  when	  its	  primary	  role	  should	  have	  been	  regulatory	  oversight	  
(Hirsh,	  1999,	  p.	  250).	  For	  example,	  it	  was	  using	  traditional,	  cost-­‐of-­‐service	  methods	  to	  
determine	  utility	  rates	  while	  also	  using	  performance-­‐based	  methods	  to	  calculate	  QFs	  and	  
demand-­‐side	  management	  payments.	  The	  commissioners	  saw	  the	  market	  as	  a	  way	  to	  simplify	  
regulation	  (Parrish,	  1994a).	  
Responding	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  request,	  the	  Division	  of	  Strategic	  Planning	  released	  a	  
report	  entitled	  California’s	  Electric	  Services	  Industry:	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  Past,	  Strategies	  for	  the	  
Future	  in	  February	  1993.	  The	  “Yellow	  Book”—as	  it	  came	  to	  be	  known	  for	  its	  bright	  cover—
concluded	  that	  “the	  state	  should	  reform	  its	  regulatory	  program”	  because	  it	  believed	  that	  the	  
regulatory	  framework	  (developed	  during	  an	  earlier	  era)	  no	  longer	  seemed	  appropriate	  to	  
govern	  the	  electric	  power	  industry	  (CPUC,	  1993,	  p.1).	  It	  offered	  four	  options	  for	  reform,	  ranging	  
from	  limited	  regulatory	  model	  reform	  to	  transitioning	  to	  a	  complete	  market	  environment—one	  
in	  which	  California’s	  three	  major	  IOUs	  would	  act	  as	  common	  electricity	  transmission	  carriers	  
while	  their	  generation	  assets	  would	  be	  divested.	  	  
Though	  different	  stakeholders	  opposed	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  reform	  options,	  in	  April	  
1994,	  the	  CPUC	  issued	  the	  Orders	  Instituting	  Rulemaking	  and	  Investigation	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  
Proposed	  Policies	  Governing	  Restructuring	  California’s	  Electric	  Services	  Industry	  and	  Reforming	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Regulation.25	  The	  “Blue	  Book”—again,	  so	  called	  for	  its	  cover	  color—became	  a	  landmark	  
document	  in	  California’s	  history,	  initiating	  a	  policy	  making	  process	  that	  would	  shift	  the	  state’s	  
electricity	  industry	  away	  from	  the	  regulatory	  compact	  framework	  that	  it	  had	  known	  for	  the	  past	  
century.	  One	  of	  the	  commissioners,	  Jessie	  Knight,	  Jr.,	  brought	  forth	  the	  CPUC’s	  original	  Direct	  
Access	  proposal	  that	  allowed	  customers	  to	  have	  “direct	  access”	  to	  electricity	  suppliers	  (such	  as	  
IOUs	  and	  independent	  power	  producers).	  The	  Direct	  Access	  proposal	  required	  transmission-­‐
owning	  utilities	  to	  wheel	  power	  for	  customers	  so	  that	  they	  could	  contract	  directly	  with	  
electricity	  suppliers,	  agreeing	  on	  any	  terms	  (CPUC,	  1995a).	  The	  alternative	  was	  a	  proposal	  
called	  “PoolCo,”	  advanced	  by	  Fessler,	  Southern	  California	  Edison	  (SCE)	  and	  San	  Diego	  Gas	  and	  
Electric	  (SDG&E),	  two	  of	  California’s	  three	  major	  IOUs.	  The	  PoolCo	  approach	  required	  the	  three	  
major	  IOUs—Pacific	  Gas	  &	  Electric	  (PG&E),	  SCE,	  SDG&E—to	  place	  all	  their	  generation	  and	  
transmission	  assets	  under	  the	  dispatch	  control	  a	  common	  power	  pool’s	  independent	  system	  
operator,	  and	  purchase	  electricity	  only	  from	  the	  pool.	  Other	  producers	  and	  utilities	  (such	  as	  
independent	  power	  producers	  and	  municipal	  utilities)	  could	  also	  choose	  to	  participate,	  but	  only	  
utilities	  (such	  as	  IOUs	  and	  municipal	  utilities)	  could	  buy	  power	  from	  the	  pool—meaning	  that	  
customers	  would	  still	  have	  to	  purchase	  power	  from	  these	  latter	  entities.	  PoolCo	  tried	  to	  mimic	  
the	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  a	  true	  market	  by	  giving	  producers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  sell	  electricity	  
through	  the	  pool	  by	  bidding	  the	  lowest	  selling	  price.	  When	  the	  system	  operator	  purchased	  the	  
needed	  amount	  of	  power,	  all	  producers	  were	  paid	  a	  uniform,	  disclosed	  market-­‐clearing	  price.	  
Utilities	  would	  then	  buy	  power	  from	  the	  pool	  for	  electricity	  customers	  in	  their	  service	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  For	  a	  good	  overview	  of	  various	  stakeholders’	  reactions	  to	  the	  Yellow	  Book,	  see	  Hirsh,	  1999,	  p.	  250-­‐252.	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territories.	  Like	  FERC	  Order	  No.	  888,	  both	  proposals	  recommended	  that	  IOUs	  be	  allowed	  to	  
recover	  stranded	  costs	  for	  investments	  they	  had	  made	  under	  the	  old	  regulatory	  system.	  
	  
3.2 Opportunities	  and	  Challenges	  for	  Renewables	  
	  
The	  consequences	  of	  how	  public	  policies,	  such	  as	  renewable	  generation,	  would	  be	  
addressed	  in	  retail	  restructuring	  would	  not	  only	  be	  significant	  for	  stakeholders	  in	  California,	  but	  
elsewhere	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Regulators	  and	  legislators	  in	  other	  states	  interested	  in	  deregulation	  had	  
watched	  California	  with	  the	  anticipation	  that	  its	  experiences	  would	  provide	  them	  with	  lessons	  
learned	  (Hirsh,	  1999).	  Supporters	  of	  public	  goods	  programs	  were	  concerned	  that	  restructuring	  
without	  policy	  intervention	  would	  disadvantage	  renewables	  because	  of	  market	  failures,	  
including	  environmental	  externalities,	  market	  entry	  barriers,	  and	  ‘free	  riding’	  (Rader	  and	  
Norgaard,	  1996).	  A	  month	  before	  the	  CPUC	  released	  the	  Blue	  Book,	  a	  coalition	  of	  
environmental,	  consumer,	  and	  labor	  groups	  (including	  AWEA	  and	  Natural	  Resources	  Defense	  
Council	  [NRDC])	  issued	  a	  ‘joint	  declaration’	  that	  retail	  wheeling—the	  main	  mechanism	  allowing	  
competition—would	  turn	  the	  electricity	  sector	  into	  “a	  commodity	  exchange,	  encouraging	  
companies	  to	  pass	  up	  investments	  in	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  renewable	  energy”	  (Hirsh,	  1999,	  p.	  
251).	  In	  a	  journal	  article,	  Rader	  challenged	  the	  overarching	  assumption	  that	  the	  most	  important	  
metric	  is	  economic	  efficiency:	  she	  argued	  that	  even	  when	  economic	  efficiency	  is	  achieved,	  how	  
various	  parts	  of	  the	  pie	  is	  distributed	  cannot	  be	  answered	  by	  economic	  theory	  (Rader	  and	  
Norgaard,	  1996).	  Though	  deregulation	  affected	  many	  industries	  at	  the	  time,	  distribution—the	  
question	  of	  equity—was	  particularly	  important	  for	  the	  electricity	  sector	  because	  power	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production	  impacted	  future	  generations	  through	  fossil	  fuel	  consumption,	  environmental	  
degradation,	  and	  climate	  change	  effects.	  	  
Restructuring,	  however,	  also	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  strengthen	  renewables.	  Wiser	  et	  al	  
(1996)	  argued	  it	  would	  allow	  customers	  to	  directly	  support	  renewables	  (polls	  had	  shown	  the	  
majority	  of	  California	  residents	  supported	  renewable	  energy)	  and	  increase	  access	  to	  the	  grid	  to	  
serve	  demand	  markets	  distant	  from	  renewable	  generation	  sites.	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  
restructuring	  process	  deviated	  drastically	  from	  the	  regulatory	  compact	  model	  familiar	  to	  the	  
industry	  and	  forced	  stakeholders	  to	  gather	  in	  a	  forum	  to	  discuss,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  future	  
of	  the	  state’s	  renewable	  energy	  sector.	  Deregulation	  allowed	  for	  the	  consideration	  of	  new	  
ideas.	  And	  it	  was	  in	  this	  environment	  that	  the	  RPS	  emerged	  as	  a	  policy	  option.	  
3.2.1 Origins	  of	  the	  RPS	  
Believing	  PURPA	  had	  proven	  ineffective	  at	  spurring	  renewable	  energy	  development	  and	  
concerned	  that	  policy	  makers	  would	  become	  even	  less	  willing	  to	  actively	  support	  renewables,	  
AWEA	  wanted	  to	  find	  a	  new	  policy	  instrument	  that	  would	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  increasingly	  
competitive	  electric	  industry	  (Swisher	  &	  Porter,	  2006).	  The	  organization	  hired	  Rader	  in	  1993	  
specifically	  for	  this	  objective	  (R.	  Swisher,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  2,	  2014;	  N.	  Rader,	  
personal	  communication,	  April	  14,	  2014).	  After	  dialogue	  with	  other	  renewable	  energy	  
organizations	  and	  advocates,	  AWEA	  developed	  the	  basic	  concept	  of	  the	  RPS	  (Swisher	  &	  Porter,	  
2006).	  The	  organization	  took	  a	  policy	  they	  had	  been	  developing	  for	  the	  regulatory	  arena—a	  
carve	  out—and	  coupled	  it	  with	  a	  tradable	  mechanism	  so	  that	  the	  policy	  mandate	  could	  be	  met	  
in	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  way	  (N.	  Rader,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  14,	  2014).	  Rader	  first	  
presented	  the	  idea	  at	  a	  National	  Wind	  Coordinating	  Committee	  conference,	  where	  “it	  seemed	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pretty	  radical	  to	  everyone	  that	  we	  would	  be	  heading	  into	  a	  deregulated	  market,	  yet	  advocating	  
for	  a	  market	  share	  mandate”	  (N.	  Rader,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  14,	  2014).26	  The	  RPS	  
was	  not	  immediately	  embraced.	  Rader	  moved	  quickly	  from	  advocating	  for	  the	  RPS	  nationally	  to	  
focusing	  within	  California	  as	  the	  CPUC	  released	  the	  Blue	  Book.	  	  
Around	  the	  same	  time,	  UCS	  was	  working	  on	  very	  similar	  efforts	  to	  create	  policies	  that	  
would	  guarantee	  long-­‐term	  stability	  in	  the	  renewables	  market—they	  called	  it	  “sustained	  
orderly	  development”	  (Gipe,	  1995).	  The	  original	  idea	  was	  elucidated	  by	  the	  Center	  for	  Energy	  
Efficiency	  and	  Renewable	  Technologies	  (CEERT).27	  Long-­‐term	  stability	  was	  necessary	  to	  give	  the	  
renewables	  industry	  the	  security	  and	  incentive	  to	  streamline	  and	  innovate,	  thereby	  driving	  
down	  the	  cost	  of	  renewable	  energy	  technologies.	  UCS	  cited	  the	  sustained	  orderly	  development	  
of	  wind	  technology	  in	  the	  1980s	  (enabled	  by	  California’s	  generous	  standard	  offer	  contracts)	  as	  
the	  main	  driver	  for	  the	  falling	  electricity	  costs	  of	  wind	  power	  (Gipe,	  1995).	  UCS	  hired	  Aitken	  in	  
1992	  as	  its	  West	  Cost	  representative;	  he	  had	  been	  well	  known	  for	  championing	  the	  idea	  of	  
sustained	  orderly	  development	  in	  the	  solar	  industry	  and	  began	  advancing	  it	  to	  the	  larger	  
renewables	  community	  in	  California.	  Because	  of	  their	  shared	  belief	  that	  a	  minimum	  renewable	  
energy	  mandate	  would	  provide	  the	  strongest	  guarantee	  of	  a	  sustainable,	  long-­‐term	  market	  for	  
renewables,	  Rader	  and	  Aitken	  collaboratively	  advocated	  for	  the	  RPS	  during	  the	  CPUC’s	  
restructuring	  proceedings.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Now	  named	  the	  National	  Wind	  Coordinating	  Collaborative,	  the	  organizations	  was	  formed	  in	  1994	  to	  provide	  a	  
forum	  for	  stakeholders	  with	  shared	  objectives	  of	  developing	  commercial	  markets	  for	  wind	  power	  in	  the	  U.S.	  For	  
more	  information,	  refer	  to	  http://nationalwind.org/about-­‐nwcc/history.	  
27	  Since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  Center	  for	  Energy	  Efficiency	  and	  Renewable	  Technologies,	  a	  coalition	  of	  major	  
environmental	  groups	  and	  private-­‐sector	  clean	  energy	  companies,	  has	  worked	  heavily	  with	  California	  legislators	  to	  
promote	  renewable	  energy	  development	  in	  California	  and	  the	  West.	  For	  more	  information,	  refer	  to	  
http://ceert.org/about-­‐ceert/.	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3.2.2 Concerns	  with	  Green	  Power	  Marketing	  
From	  the	  beginning,	  there	  was	  no	  consensus,	  even	  within	  the	  CPUC,	  on	  how	  to	  promote	  
renewables.	  A	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  article	  published	  one	  day	  after	  the	  Blue	  Book’s	  issuance	  
reported	  that	  during	  deliberations,	  Commissioner	  Gregory	  Conlon	  initially	  “argued	  for	  a	  rate	  
surcharge	  in	  the	  new	  system	  to	  continue	  support	  [for	  renewables]”	  (Parrish,	  1994a,	  p.	  A1).	  
However,	  the	  formal	  proposal	  put	  forth	  by	  the	  agency	  advocated	  for	  a	  voluntary	  green	  power	  
market	  to	  give	  customers	  the	  option	  of	  paying	  more	  to	  support	  renewables	  (CPUC,	  1994).28	  The	  
CPUC’s	  rationale	  was	  that	  in	  a	  marketplace,	  those	  who	  have	  a	  preference	  for	  renewable	  energy	  
(and	  its	  benefits)	  will	  express	  it	  through	  their	  purchasing	  decisions.	  	  
This	  policy	  instrument	  was	  criticized	  by	  environmental	  and	  renewable	  energy	  
organizations	  because	  it	  didn’t	  provide	  any	  certainty	  of	  a	  renewable	  energy	  market,	  much	  less	  
how	  big	  that	  market	  would	  be	  (Fang	  and	  Galen,	  1996).	  NRDC	  and	  the	  Sierra	  Club	  were	  among	  
those	  that	  asserted	  that	  consumers	  would	  ignore	  the	  public	  goods	  resulting	  from	  renewable	  
energy	  generation	  and	  instead	  focus	  on	  cheap	  electricity	  (Hirsh,	  1999).	  Rader	  elaborated	  on	  
these	  assertions	  by	  arguing	  that	  consumers	  who	  would	  otherwise	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  for	  
renewables	  may	  not	  do	  so	  because	  as	  rational	  actors,	  they	  would	  be	  concerned	  about	  paying	  
for	  ‘free	  riders’.	  She	  argued	  that	  renewable	  energy	  provides	  an	  alternative	  to	  consumption	  of	  
finite	  fossil	  fuels,	  produces	  less	  environmental	  degradation,	  and	  helps	  mitigate	  greenhouse	  gas	  
emissions	  that	  contribute	  to	  climate	  change.	  Such	  benefits	  are	  non-­‐excludable	  and	  non-­‐
rivalrous,	  meaning	  that	  individuals	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  from	  having	  them	  and	  the	  benefits	  they	  
receive	  do	  not	  reduce	  those	  of	  others.	  These	  attributes	  make	  renewable	  generation	  produce	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  This	  is	  also	  known	  as	  a	  “green	  pricing	  method”.	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public	  goods	  and,	  Rader	  asserted,	  “markets	  do	  not	  provide	  public	  goods	  since	  individuals	  will	  
not	  volunteer	  to	  pay	  for	  benefits	  that	  accrue	  to	  everyone”	  (Rader	  and	  Norgaard,	  1996,	  p.	  40).	  
Environmental	  organizations	  also	  appealed	  to	  the	  CPUC’s	  legislative	  responsibilities,	  
citing	  that	  unrestrained	  private	  markets	  would	  erode	  the	  state’s	  historical	  commitment	  to	  
renewable	  energy	  sources	  (Parrish,	  1994a).	  Writing	  on	  behalf	  of	  NRDC	  in	  March	  1993,	  Ralph	  
Cavanagh	  reminded	  the	  CPUC	  that	  its	  obligations	  under	  state	  law	  extended	  beyond	  seeking	  
low-­‐cost	  electricity	  to	  improving	  the	  environment	  and	  diversifying	  California’s	  energy	  portfolio	  
(NRDC,	  1993).29	  The	  following	  year,	  the	  legislature	  provided	  stronger	  incentive	  to	  encourage	  
the	  CPUC	  to	  meet	  its	  legal	  duties.	  In	  May	  1994,	  legislators	  expressed	  concern	  that	  the	  CPUC’s	  
procedural	  schedule	  for	  receiving	  public	  comment	  on	  restructuring	  was	  moving	  too	  quickly	  to	  
allow	  the	  agency	  to	  fully	  explore	  its	  impacts.	  With	  respect	  to	  renewables,	  Byron	  Sher,	  chairman	  
of	  the	  State	  Assembly’s	  Natural	  Resources	  Committee,	  noted	  that	  the	  proposal	  “appeared	  
inconsistent	  with	  state	  policies	  that	  encouraged	  environmental	  protection	  and	  development	  of	  
a	  diverse	  mix	  of	  generation	  resources”	  (Parrish,	  1994b,	  p.	  D3).	  In	  August,	  the	  legislature	  passed	  
a	  resolution	  to	  create	  a	  Joint	  Oversight	  Committee	  on	  Lowering	  the	  Cost	  of	  Electric	  Services,	  to	  
which	  the	  CPUC	  was	  required	  to	  submit	  a	  report	  on	  how	  its	  proposal	  would	  affect	  legislative	  
mandates	  to	  meet	  environmental	  and	  fuel	  diversity	  goals.30	  To	  ensure	  the	  CPUC’s	  cooperation,	  
Assembly	  Speaker	  Willie	  Brown	  threatened	  to	  withhold	  its	  budget	  (Hirsh,	  1999).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  
agency	  became	  more	  open	  to	  policy	  mandates	  that	  would	  provide	  stronger	  support	  for	  
renewables,	  thus	  allowing	  the	  RPS	  and	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  to	  emerge	  as	  the	  main	  policy	  
contenders.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Cavanagh	  cited	  Cal.	  Pub.	  Util.	  Code	  §701.1.	  
30	  See	  California	  Assembly	  Concurrent	  Resolution	  No.	  143,	  August	  31,	  1994.	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3.2.3 Different	  Decisions	  in	  the	  California	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  and	  the	  California	  
Legislature	  
	  
When	  Rader	  and	  Aitken	  introduced	  the	  RPS	  in	  the	  CPUC,	  their	  framing	  of	  the	  policy	  
instrument	  heavily	  emphasized	  its	  market	  trading	  mechanism	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  market	  ideology	  
of	  the	  restructuring	  process.	  These	  arguments	  resonated	  strongly	  with	  some	  of	  the	  
commissioners	  and	  in	  the	  agency’s	  December	  1995	  restructuring	  order,	  they	  endorsed	  the	  
concept	  of	  a	  minimum	  renewable	  purchase	  requirement	  (MRPR)	  to	  support	  renewables	  (CPUC,	  
1995c).31	  The	  decision	  directed	  affected	  stakeholders,	  including	  renewables	  trade	  groups,	  
environmental	  organizations,	  utilities,	  and	  large	  electricity	  customers,	  to	  form	  a	  Renewables	  
Working	  Group	  (RWG)	  to	  provide	  recommendations	  on	  implementation	  details.	  However,	  the	  
stakeholders	  could	  not	  reach	  a	  consensus	  on	  a	  single	  renewable	  policy	  instrument.	  The	  RWG	  
report	  filed	  on	  August	  23,	  1996	  contained	  six	  different	  comprehensive	  proposals:	  five	  MRPR	  
variations	  and	  one	  surcharge	  fund	  proposal	  (Renewables	  Working	  Group	  [RWG],	  1996).	  MRPR	  
supporters	  included	  most	  of	  the	  renewables	  trade	  groups	  and	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  
environmental	  organizations	  and	  electric	  utilities.	  Surcharge	  fund	  advocates	  included	  most	  of	  
the	  major	  environmental	  organizations,	  the	  IOUs,	  industrial	  customers,	  and	  power	  marketers	  
(RWG,	  1996).	  The	  contentions	  that	  had	  played	  out	  in	  the	  RWG	  also	  took	  place	  during	  legislative	  
conference	  committee	  hearings	  in	  July	  and	  August	  of	  1996.	  Unlike	  the	  Commission,	  the	  
committee	  chose	  to	  promote	  renewables	  through	  a	  non-­‐bypassable	  surcharge	  fund.	  One	  of	  the	  
major	  criticisms	  committee	  members	  had	  of	  the	  RPS	  was	  that	  it	  was	  incongruent	  to	  
restructuring—meaning	  it	  would	  exert	  too	  much	  government	  intervention	  in	  a	  process	  that	  was	  
moving	  away	  from	  regulation	  (N.	  Rader,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  14,	  2014;	  K.	  Lipper,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  The	  RPS	  concept	  was	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  minimum	  renewable	  purchase	  requirement.	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personal	  communication,	  April	  2,	  2014).	  AB	  1890,	  the	  restructuring	  legislation,	  specified	  that	  
over	  the	  five-­‐year	  transition	  period,	  the	  three	  major	  IOUs	  would	  collect	  a	  total	  of	  $540	  million	  
dollars	  that	  would	  be	  distributed	  to	  renewable	  energy	  projects.	  The	  mechanics	  of	  how	  the	  fund	  
would	  be	  allocated	  was	  delegated	  to	  the	  CEC.	  Figure	  2	  shows	  the	  renewables	  policy	  	  
Figure	  2:	  Renewable	  Policy	  Decisions	  During	  California’s	  Restructuring	  Process	  
	  
instruments	  the	  CPUC	  and	  the	  legislature	  chose	  at	  various	  times	  during	  the	  state’s	  restructuring	  
process.	  The	  narrow,	  green	  arrow	  between	  December	  1995	  and	  August	  1996	  indicates	  the	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4 THE	  DEBATE	  BETWEEN	  THE	  RENEWABLE	  PORTFOLIO	  STANDARD	  
AND	  A	  NON-­‐BYPASSABLE	  SURCHARGE	  FUND	  IN	  CALIFORNIA	  
	  
At	  the	  core	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  how	  renewables	  should	  be	  promoted	  during	  the	  California	  
restructuring	  process	  was	  a	  dynamic,	  sometimes-­‐contingent	  cross-­‐sectoral	  exploration	  of	  what	  
restructuring	  meant	  for	  renewable	  energy	  development.	  This	  section	  elucidates	  the	  two	  
intertwined	  debates	  between	  the	  RPS	  and	  the	  surcharge	  fund:	  a	  policy	  instrument	  debate	  and	  a	  
political	  economy	  debate.	  It	  asserts	  the	  importance	  in	  acknowledging	  both	  debates	  in	  
understanding	  what	  happened	  to	  influence	  the	  decision	  outcomes	  mapped	  in	  Figure	  2	  and	  why	  
often,	  it	  was	  not	  apparent	  which	  policy	  instrument	  would	  be	  chosen.	  This	  section	  pushes	  back	  
on	  the	  pervasive	  tendency	  in	  energy	  policy	  scholarship	  to	  speak	  about	  policy	  instrument	  
debates	  as	  though	  they	  are	  separate	  from	  the	  contexts	  that	  produced	  them.	  It	  shows	  that	  while	  
the	  technocratic	  aspects	  of	  policy	  instruments	  is	  easier	  and	  more	  straight	  forward	  to	  parse,	  it	  is	  
disadvantageous,	  even	  dangerous,	  to	  leave	  the	  political	  economy	  debate	  unacknowledged—
because	  these	  contestations	  often	  have	  far	  greater	  influence	  on	  policy	  outcomes.	  	  
	  
4.1 The	  Mechanisms	  of	  the	  RPS	  and	  Surcharge	  Fund	  
During	  the	  restructuring	  process	  in	  California,	  the	  RPS	  was	  more	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  
“minimum	  renewable	  purchase	  requirement”.	  Rader	  and	  Aitken	  proposed	  to	  call	  it	  a	  
“renewables	  portfolio	  standard”	  as	  the	  idea	  emerged	  as	  a	  strong	  policy	  contender	  in	  the	  
CPUC.32	  Both	  names—“standard”	  and	  “requirement”—convey	  there	  is	  a	  minimum	  mandate.	  As	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  See	  “Comments	  of	  the	  American	  Wind	  Energy	  Association	  and	  the	  Union	  of	  Concerned	  Scientists	  on	  the	  
Alternative	  Proposals	  Issued	  May	  24,	  1995,	  to	  Restructure	  California’s	  Electric	  Services	  Industry	  and	  Reform	  
Regulation”,	  Docket	  No.	  94-­‐04-­‐031,	  July	  24,	  1995,	  p.	  2:	  “The	  proposed	  policy,	  which	  we	  call	  a	  ‘renewables	  portfolio	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well,	  the	  non-­‐bypassable	  surchage	  fund	  was	  often	  called	  a	  “system	  benefits	  charge”.	  The	  
respective	  names	  for	  each	  policy	  instrument	  are	  used	  interchangeably	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
The	  California	  RPS	  would	  have	  most	  likely	  required	  electricity	  retail	  suppliers	  to	  source	  a	  
minimum	  percentage	  of	  their	  energy	  from	  renewable	  generators.	  Although	  deliberations	  never	  
progressed	  to	  specify	  an	  official	  percentage	  in	  1996,	  most	  of	  the	  proposals	  included	  in	  the	  RWG	  
report	  recommended	  a	  percentage	  on	  par	  with	  existing	  levels	  of	  state-­‐wide	  renewable	  
generation:	  roughly	  10-­‐13%	  (Kirshner	  et	  al,	  1997;	  RWG,	  1996).33	  Electricity	  suppliers	  would	  be	  
required	  to	  demonstrate	  it	  owned	  RECs	  equivalent	  to	  the	  mandated	  percentage	  of	  its	  total	  
annual	  sales.34	  A	  tradable	  RECs	  market	  would	  allow	  suppliers	  to	  find	  the	  least-­‐costly	  way	  to	  
fulfill	  the	  mandate.	  Because	  the	  markets	  for	  RECs	  and	  electric	  power	  are	  separate,	  an	  electricity	  
supplier	  would	  have	  several	  ways	  to	  acquire	  RECs:	  generate	  RECs	  if	  it	  owned	  qualifying	  
renewable	  energy	  facilities,	  purchase	  RECs	  bundled	  with	  renewable	  power,	  or	  purchase	  RECs	  
separately.	  If	  legislation	  were	  enacted	  for	  an	  RPS,	  it	  would	  have	  provided	  a	  long-­‐term,	  
predictable	  demand	  for	  renewables.	  
The	  non-­‐bypassable	  fund	  would	  require	  all	  electricity	  customers	  in	  the	  new	  market—
both	  those	  who	  remained	  with	  the	  same	  retail	  supplier	  and	  those	  who	  switched—to	  pay	  a	  
small	  charge	  on	  their	  electricity	  bill	  to	  support	  renewables	  (Kirshner	  et.	  al,	  1997).	  Suppliers,	  
namely	  the	  three	  major	  IOUs,	  would	  pool	  the	  collection	  into	  a	  central	  fund	  that	  would	  then	  be	  
distributed	  to	  renewable	  energy	  projects.	  The	  surcharge	  fund	  proposed	  by	  the	  RWG	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
standard’,	  is	  a	  market-­‐based	  strategy	  that	  will	  achieve	  the	  state-­‐mandated	  goal	  of	  a	  diverse	  resource	  base	  while	  
minimizing	  bureaucratic	  implementation."	  	  
33	  Estimates	  differed	  on	  existing	  levels	  of	  renewables	  in	  1996.	  The	  CPUC	  RWG	  estimated	  renewables	  at	  13%	  while	  
legislative	  estimates	  were	  around	  10%.	  
34	  Though	  in	  theory	  the	  mandate	  could	  be	  imposed	  upon	  either	  electricity	  retail	  suppliers	  or	  consumers,	  the	  RPS	  
advocated	  at	  the	  time	  favored	  the	  former.	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recommended	  a	  funding	  level	  of	  about	  $100	  million	  annually	  during	  the	  restructuring	  transition	  
from	  1998-­‐2002	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1996).	  The	  legislature’s	  version	  of	  the	  fund	  in	  AB	  1890	  revised	  the	  
total	  to	  $540	  million	  over	  the	  five	  years.	  Later	  analysis	  showed	  that	  this	  sum	  resulted	  in	  an	  
increase	  of	  $0.00008	  per	  kilowatt-­‐hour	  (kWh)	  to	  the	  average	  electric	  rate	  in	  California	  (Wiser	  et	  
al,	  1998).	  Several	  distribution	  mechanisms	  were	  possible	  to	  fund	  renewables	  projects,	  including	  
competitive	  auctions,	  first-­‐come,	  first-­‐serve,	  or	  “at	  the	  administrator’s	  discrimination”.	  These	  
allocation	  methods	  could	  have	  been	  given	  in	  the	  form	  of	  production	  incentives,	  power	  sales	  
contracts,	  or	  grants	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1996).	  Most	  surcharge	  fund	  advocates	  favored	  production	  
credits	  allocated	  through	  an	  auction	  process	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1996;	  Kirshner	  et	  al,	  1997).	  To	  
compete	  for	  funds,	  renewables	  project	  developers	  would	  bid	  the	  amount	  of	  additional	  per-­‐kWh	  
support	  they	  required	  above	  the	  market	  price	  of	  electricity	  to	  remain	  competitive.	  Winners	  of	  
the	  auction	  would	  be	  those	  projects	  that	  could	  bring	  generation	  costs	  as	  close	  to	  the	  market	  
price	  of	  electricity	  as	  possible—in	  other	  words,	  those	  that	  are	  near	  cost	  parity	  with	  
conventional	  generation.	  The	  surcharge	  fund	  included	  in	  AB	  1890	  was	  a	  short-­‐term	  policy	  that	  
applied	  only	  during	  the	  transition	  period.	  	  
While	  the	  RPS	  was	  a	  novel	  policy	  idea,	  the	  California	  IOUs	  were	  familiar	  with	  surcharges,	  
which	  had	  also	  been	  used	  to	  fund	  other	  public	  good	  programs,	  such	  as	  energy	  efficiency,	  
research	  and	  development,	  and	  low-­‐income	  assistance.	  Abroad,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  had	  used	  
a	  similar	  tax	  on	  electricity	  consumption	  to	  fund	  its	  renewables	  non-­‐fossil	  fuel	  obligation	  
(Mitchell,	  1995).	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4.2 The	  RPS	  versus	  the	  Surcharge	  Fund	  as	  a	  Policy	  Instrument	  Debate	  
4.2.1 Dispelling	  the	  Market	  Rhetoric	  
Both	  the	  RPS	  and	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  were	  policy	  interventions.	  Despite	  advocates’	  
emphasis	  on	  both	  instruments’	  market	  mechanisms,	  neither	  was	  a	  market	  solution.	  To	  appeal	  
to	  an	  audience	  engaged	  in	  restructuring	  deliberations,	  RPS	  proponents	  heavily	  emphasized	  the	  
policy’s	  tradable	  RECs,	  going	  as	  far	  as	  to	  call	  the	  RPS	  a	  “market-­‐based	  strategy”.35	  However	  the	  
strength	  of	  the	  RPS	  is	  its	  mandate	  for	  a	  specific	  level	  of	  renewable	  energy.	  Rader	  confirmed	  
that	  AWEA	  did	  not	  endorse	  the	  transition	  to	  an	  electricity	  market,	  but	  saw	  the	  RPS	  as	  the	  
strongest	  policy	  to	  correct	  for	  market	  failures	  while	  providing	  a	  market-­‐friendly	  way	  to	  fulfill	  
the	  mandate	  (N.	  Rader,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  14,	  2014).	  Thus,	  the	  trading	  of	  RECs	  is	  a	  
second-­‐tier	  function	  to	  what	  is	  at	  the	  core	  a	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  policy.	  Like	  their	  RPS	  
counterparts,	  surcharge	  fund	  proponents	  also	  spotlighted	  its	  market	  mechanism—the	  
production-­‐incentive	  auction—in	  contending	  the	  fund’s	  superiority	  as	  a	  policy	  instrument.	  
Representatives	  from	  Environmental	  Defense	  Fund	  (EDF),	  SCE,	  and	  PG&E	  argued	  that	  the	  
auction	  was	  efficient	  because	  it	  would	  support	  the	  most	  amount	  of	  renewables	  development	  
with	  limited	  funds:	  “[it]	  depend[s]	  on	  open	  competitive	  markets,	  because	  decisions	  as	  to	  what	  
type	  of	  renewable	  resources	  are	  most	  cost	  effective	  will	  be	  left	  to	  private	  market	  participants”	  
(Kirshner	  et	  al,	  1997,	  p.	  56).	  Furthermore,	  the	  advocates	  contended	  that	  the	  fund’s	  distribution	  
method	  made	  it	  “a	  more	  efficient	  path	  to	  support	  …	  renewable	  energy	  development	  than	  the	  
RPS”	  (Kirshner	  et	  al,	  1997,	  p.	  55).	  Despite	  such	  rhetorical	  appeal	  to	  market	  efficiency,	  the	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  footnote	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production-­‐incentive	  auction	  is	  also	  a	  second-­‐tier	  mechanism	  to	  a	  mandated,	  cost-­‐explicit	  
surcharge	  fund.	  	  
Though	  different	  renewables	  and	  environmental	  groups	  advocated	  for	  each	  instrument,	  
all	  groups	  assumed	  that	  if	  the	  new	  retail	  market	  were	  left	  unchecked,	  it	  would	  not	  produce	  
socially-­‐desirable	  levels	  of	  renewable	  generation.	  On	  this	  front,	  all	  organizations	  were	  united	  in	  
asserting	  that	  renewable	  technologies	  required	  policy	  intervention	  to	  correct	  for	  market	  
failures.	  These	  failures	  included:	  non-­‐internalized	  public	  goods;	  existing	  price	  distortions	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  unequal	  tax	  treatment	  for	  and	  subsidies	  provided	  to	  conventional	  electric	  generation;	  
and	  potential	  information	  asymmetry	  that	  prevented	  markets	  from	  working	  effectively	  (Wiser	  
and	  Pickle,	  1997).	  Environmental	  and	  renewables	  organizations	  used	  these	  arguments	  to	  
compel	  the	  CPUC	  to	  consider	  stronger	  policy	  than	  the	  green	  power	  marketing	  strategy	  it	  had	  
initially	  endorsed.36	  Ryan	  Wiser,	  who	  served	  as	  the	  moderator	  of	  the	  RWG,	  observed	  in	  a	  later	  
publication:	  “Electricity	  restructuring	  by	  itself	  will	  not	  overcome	  market	  failures.	  If	  public	  
policies	  for	  renewables	  were	  justified	  before	  electricity	  restructuring	  began,	  there	  appears	  to	  
be	  no	  economic	  reason	  for	  them	  now	  to	  become	  unjustified”	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1998,	  p.	  467).	  
4.2.2 Policy	  Interventions:	  Quantity	  versus	  Cost	  
The	  policy	  instrument	  debate	  between	  the	  RPS	  and	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  was	  about	  the	  
different	  guarantees,	  and	  thus	  consequences,	  provided	  by	  a	  quantity-­‐based	  and	  a	  cost-­‐based	  
policy.	  The	  RPS	  made	  explicit	  the	  amount	  of	  renewable	  generation	  that	  would	  be	  produced	  
while	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  provided	  certainty	  in	  the	  cost	  contributed	  toward	  it.	  The	  RPS	  creates	  a	  
strong	  mechanism	  to	  ‘pull’	  renewables	  into	  a	  competitive	  market	  by	  carving	  out	  their	  market	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  See	  discussion	  in	  section	  3.2.2	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share.	  The	  surcharge	  fund	  provides	  an	  “incremental”	  advantage	  for	  renewables	  in	  an	  attempt	  
to	  ‘jump-­‐start’	  or	  ‘push’	  them	  into	  the	  market.37	  In	  the	  California	  context,	  this	  difference	  had	  
substantial	  implications	  for	  the	  various	  stakeholders,	  resulting	  in	  the	  contentious	  debate	  
between	  the	  two	  instruments.	  	  
4.2.2.1 Existing	  Renewables	  Projects	  Impacts	  
	  
All	  the	  RPS-­‐based	  proposals	  in	  the	  RWG	  report	  prioritized	  the	  level	  of	  renewable	  energy	  
generation.	  Four	  MRPR	  proposals	  set	  the	  standard	  to	  maintain	  the	  existing	  renewables	  industry	  
and	  one	  (submitted	  by	  AWEA,	  UCS,	  and	  renewable	  energy	  associations)	  included	  annual	  
increases	  to	  the	  standard	  (RWG,	  1996).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  prioritized	  cost.	  Many	  in	  
the	  renewables	  industry	  feared	  that	  $540	  million	  over	  five	  years	  would	  be	  insufficient	  to	  meet	  
the	  needs	  of	  existing	  renewables	  projects;	  they	  argued	  the	  industry	  would	  decline	  once	  
facilities	  reached	  the	  end	  of	  their	  10-­‐year,	  high	  fixed-­‐price	  contracts	  and	  were	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  
remain	  cost	  competitive	  with	  conventional	  generators	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1996).	  Effectively,	  
renewables	  would	  be	  marginalized	  with	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  instrument.	  	  
4.2.2.2 New	  Renewables	  Projects	  Impacts	  
	  
New	  renewable	  projects	  rely	  heavily	  on	  project	  financing	  to	  be	  viable	  because	  of	  high	  
capital	  costs.	  To	  gain	  project	  financing,	  projects	  must	  demonstrate	  they	  have	  a	  guaranteed	  
revenue	  stream,	  such	  as	  long-­‐term	  power	  sales	  or	  RECs	  contracts.	  Therefore,	  how	  much	  
demand	  and	  long-­‐term	  continuity	  a	  policy	  instrument	  provides	  for	  renewables	  has	  important	  
consequences	  on	  the	  financing	  costs	  and	  viability	  of	  new	  projects	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1996).	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  Kirshner	  et	  al	  (1997)	  concludes	  that	  “the	  production	  incentive	  is	  simply	  an	  increment	  that	  helps	  renewables	  
compete	  in	  the	  market”	  (p.	  56).	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  AWEA	  and	  UCS	  argued	  that	  a	  policy	  instrument	  that	  would	  create	  sustained	  demand	  for	  
renenewables	  was	  necessary	  not	  only	  to	  carve	  out	  a	  market	  share,	  but	  also	  allow	  scales	  of	  
economy	  to	  develop,	  thereby	  driving	  down	  the	  costs	  of	  renewables	  over	  time	  (N.	  Rader,	  
personal	  communication,	  April	  14,	  2014).	  In	  addition	  to	  correcting	  for	  the	  market	  failures	  of	  
public	  goods	  services,	  information	  asymmetry,	  and	  existing	  price	  distortions,	  the	  RPS	  would	  
also	  help	  renewables	  overcome	  market	  barriers,	  such	  as	  high-­‐cost	  financing	  (Rader	  and	  
Norgaard,	  1996).	  Under	  the	  RPS,	  renewables	  projects	  would	  be	  required	  to	  arrange	  for	  sales	  in	  
the	  power	  market	  (usually	  through	  a	  spot	  market	  or	  negotiated	  bilateral	  contract).	  However,	  
because	  the	  RPS	  would	  ensure	  long-­‐term	  demand	  for	  renewable	  energy,	  it	  would	  create	  
demand	  in	  the	  RECs	  market,	  allowing	  projects	  to	  gain	  long-­‐term	  contracts,	  decrease	  lender	  risk,	  
and	  reduce	  finance	  costs.	  This	  process,	  along	  with	  technological	  innovation	  and	  project	  and	  
manufacturing	  streamlining,	  would	  drive	  down	  the	  cost	  of	  renewable	  facilities	  over	  time	  to	  
achieve	  cost	  parity	  with	  their	  fossil	  fuel	  counterparts.	  This	  particular	  aspect	  of	  the	  RPS	  appealed	  
greatly	  to	  Knight,	  who	  strongly	  advocated	  for	  the	  policy	  in	  the	  CPUC	  (N.	  Rader,	  personal	  
communication,	  April	  14,	  2014).	  	  
Because	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  did	  not	  require	  a	  specific	  level	  of	  renewable	  generation,	  it	  
would	  provide	  no	  guaranteed	  market	  demand	  for	  existing	  or	  new	  renewables.	  Like	  the	  RPS,	  
renewable	  projects	  would	  have	  to	  arrange	  for	  power	  sales.	  Those	  projects	  requiring	  the	  least	  
additional	  support	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  win	  a	  production	  credit	  through	  an	  auction.	  The	  
surcharge	  fund	  would	  guarantee	  a	  partial	  revenue	  stream	  for	  winning	  projects	  by	  paying	  them	  
a	  fixed-­‐price	  production	  credit.	  In	  the	  RWG	  surcharge	  fund	  proposal,	  the	  credit	  would	  be	  paid	  
over	  10	  years.	  Due	  to	  the	  overall	  incremental	  support	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  would	  provide	  to	  a	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small	  number	  of	  projects,	  financing	  costs	  would	  have	  likely	  remained	  high.	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  
version	  of	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  enacted	  into	  legislation,	  only	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  $540	  million	  was	  
allocated	  to	  directly	  support	  renewables	  projects.	  Four	  hundred	  sixty	  million	  dollars	  was	  
divided	  among	  existing	  ($162	  million),	  new	  ($240	  million),	  and	  higher-­‐cost,	  ‘emerging	  
renewables’	  facilities	  ($54	  million).	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  fund	  was	  used	  toward	  engaging	  electricity	  
customers	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  green	  power	  market	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1998;	  CEC,	  1997).	  As	  a	  result,	  
during	  the	  latter	  three	  years	  of	  the	  restructuring	  period,	  only	  200	  MW	  of	  new	  wind	  energy	  was	  
installed	  (U.S.	  Department	  of	  Energy,	  Energy	  Efficiency	  and	  Renewable	  Energy	  [DOE	  EERE],	  
2014).	  Even	  after	  California	  enacted	  a	  20%	  RPS	  in	  2003,	  additional	  annual	  wind	  capacity	  
through	  2009	  fluctuated	  between	  50	  and	  260	  MW.	  In	  comparison,	  during	  the	  same	  period	  
between	  2003	  and	  2009,	  annual	  national	  wind	  capacity	  grew	  from	  1600	  MW	  to	  almost	  10,000	  
MW	  (DOE	  EERE,	  2014).38	  Table	  1	  summarizes	  the	  policy	  instrument	  debate	  between	  the	  RPS	  
and	  the	  surcharge	  fund.	  	  
Table	  1:	  The	  RPS	  versus	  Surcharge	  Fund	  as	  a	  Policy	  Instrument	  Debate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  For	  a	  similar	  comparison,	  see	  Figure	  8	  for	  a	  graph	  showing	  the	  total	  wind	  capacity	  in	  California,	  Texas,	  and	  the	  
U.S.	  between	  1999	  and	  2008.	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4.2.3 Policy	  Interventions:	  A	  Matter	  of	  Degree?	  
Because	  the	  core	  question	  driving	  the	  renewables	  debate	  was	  about	  how	  much	  they	  
should	  be	  supported	  in	  a	  competitive	  market,	  a	  quantity-­‐	  and	  a	  cost-­‐explicit	  policy	  offered	  
different	  degrees	  of	  promoting	  renewables	  development.	  At	  the	  textual	  level,	  the	  policy	  
instrument	  debate	  was	  about	  “the	  desirability	  of	  supporting	  renewable	  energy	  and	  the	  
appropriate	  mechanisms	  with	  which	  to	  promote	  these	  technologies	  in	  a	  restructured	  industry”	  
(Wise	  et	  al,	  1996,	  p.1).	  The	  political	  rhetoric	  mirrored	  this	  framing,	  except	  the	  degree	  of	  support	  
appropriate	  for	  renewables	  was	  translated	  into	  the	  degree	  of	  government	  intervention	  
appropriate	  for	  restructuring.	  When	  the	  conference	  committee	  chose	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  in	  
August	  1996,	  they	  said	  the	  policy	  was	  more	  desirable	  because	  it	  was	  not	  a	  regulatory	  mandate.	  
In	  a	  report	  published	  immediately	  after	  the	  passage	  of	  AB	  1890,	  Wiser	  and	  his	  co-­‐authors	  
concluded	  with	  similar	  sentiments:	  “We	  hope	  that	  California’s	  experience	  with	  these	  issues	  will	  
help	  inform	  other	  stakeholders	  and	  states	  as	  they	  struggle	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  ‘public	  
purpose’	  programs	  in	  an	  era	  of	  electric	  industry	  restructuring”	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1996,	  p.	  19).	  To	  help	  
with	  visualizing	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  policy	  intervention,	  Figure	  3	  adds	  to	  Figure	  2	  by	  mapping	  the	  
policy	  instrument	  decisions	  along	  a	  “Policy	  Intervention”	  gradient	  (indicated	  by	  the	  broad	  arrow	  
on	  the	  left).	  Renewables	  policies	  that	  impose	  less	  regulatory	  intervention	  are	  more	  red	  and	  
placed	  near	  the	  bottom	  while	  those	  that	  impose	  more	  intervention	  are	  more	  green	  and	  placed	  
toward	  the	  top.	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Figure	  3:	  Renewable	  Policy	  Decisions	  Mapped	  By	  Degree	  of	  Policy	  Intervention	  
	  
Certainly,	  stakeholders	  engaged	  in	  the	  debate	  struggled	  to	  agree	  on	  a	  desirable	  level	  of	  
renewables	  development	  and	  consequently,	  the	  instrument	  most	  appropriate	  for	  achieving	  the	  
goal.	  As	  well,	  market-­‐oriented	  reform	  became	  a	  central	  framework,	  both	  rhetorical	  and	  real,	  to	  
evaluate	  such	  instruments.	  But	  if	  restructuring	  is	  the	  rubric	  against	  which	  these	  policy	  
instruments	  are	  judged,	  then	  how	  did	  the	  CPUC	  and	  the	  California	  legislature—both	  institutions	  
that	  desired	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  a	  strong,	  functional	  free	  market—make	  such	  disparate	  
choices	  at	  different	  times	  (as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3)?	  Or	  if	  strong	  government	  intervention	  wasn’t	  
desired,	  why	  did	  AB	  1890	  provide	  strong	  mandates	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  restructuring,	  such	  as	  
stipulating	  electricity	  rate	  freezes	  and	  rate	  reductions	  for	  certain	  customer	  classes?39	  Though	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  AB	  1890	  required	  electricity	  rates	  for	  agricultural,	  residential,	  industrial,	  and	  large	  commercial	  customers	  be	  
frozen	  at	  their	  June	  1996	  levels	  until	  the	  three	  IOUs	  recovered	  their	  generation-­‐related	  uneconomic	  costs	  (also	  
refereed	  to	  as	  stranded	  assets	  costs)	  through	  the	  competitive	  transition	  charge	  (CTC)	  or	  until	  March	  31,	  2002,	  
whichever	  was	  earlier.	  Additionally,	  rates	  for	  residential	  and	  small	  commercial	  customers	  (defined	  as	  20	  kW	  or	  less	  
during	  peak	  demand)	  would	  be	  reduced	  by	  10	  percent	  beginning	  January	  1,	  1998	  and	  remain	  at	  that	  level	  until	  the	  
IOUs	  recovered	  their	  stranded	  assets	  costs	  through	  the	  CTC,	  or	  until	  March	  31,	  2002,	  whichever	  was	  earlier	  (CA	  AB	  
1890,	  1996).	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instrument	  debate	  can	  offer	  little	  insight	  here,	  a	  political	  economy	  lens	  can	  better	  address	  
these	  questions.	  
	  
4.3 The	  RPS	  versus	  the	  Surcharge	  Fund	  as	  a	  Political	  Economy	  Debate	  
4.3.1 The	  RPS	  versus	  the	  Surcharge	  Fund	  as	  a	  Debate	  About	  Values	  	  
The	  different	  projected	  impacts	  of	  the	  RPS	  and	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  informed	  stakeholder	  
perceptions	  of	  the	  benefits	  and	  costs	  of	  renewables	  to	  them.	  Though	  the	  values	  debate	  was	  far	  
less	  articulated	  in	  the	  official	  rhetoric,	  it	  was	  also	  the	  dominant	  driver	  of	  the	  “politics”	  behind	  
the	  legislature’s	  decision.	  The	  distinction	  made	  here	  between	  a	  debate	  about	  policy	  
instruments	  and	  one	  about	  values	  is	  informed	  by	  Roger	  Pielke’s	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  
various	  types	  of	  debates	  that	  exist	  in	  science	  policy.	  Pielke	  points	  out	  that	  there	  is	  often	  an	  
attempt	  to	  frame	  a	  debate	  characterized	  by	  low	  values	  consensus	  (he	  labels	  this	  “Abortion	  
Politics”)	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  debate	  characterized	  by	  low	  information,	  but	  broad	  values	  consensus	  
(“Tornado	  Politics”)40—in	  other	  words,	  political	  controversies	  become	  scientized	  (Pielke,	  2003;	  
Sarewitz,	  2004).	  This	  happens	  because	  our	  society	  values	  scientific	  information	  (or	  in	  this	  case,	  
technical	  information)	  highly	  and	  tends	  to	  regard	  it	  as	  authoritative.	  Therefore,	  “the	  
technocratic	  impulse	  suggests	  that	  the	  reduction	  of	  scientific	  uncertainty	  necessarily	  leads	  to	  a	  
reduction	  of	  political	  uncertainty”	  (Pielke,	  2003,	  p.	  35).	  The	  technocratic	  impulse	  seemed	  to	  
apply	  for	  California’s	  1996	  renewable	  energy	  debate.	  Even	  with	  the	  recognition	  by	  many	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  In	  “Tornado	  Politics”,	  scientific	  information	  about	  the	  speed	  and	  proximity	  of	  the	  tornado	  plays	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  
informing	  a	  group’s	  decision	  because	  participants	  share	  a	  common	  objective	  of	  survival.	  In	  “Abortion	  Politics”,	  
scientific	  information	  is	  limited	  in	  helping	  a	  group	  reach	  an	  abortion	  policy	  decision	  because	  of	  participants’	  
commitments	  to	  different	  values.	  In	  Pielke’s	  context,	  politics	  is	  defined	  as	  “bargaining,	  negotiation,	  and	  
compromise	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  desired	  ends”	  (Pielke,	  2003).	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stakeholders	  that	  ultimately,	  “politics”	  drove	  the	  legislature’s	  policy	  decision,	  there	  was	  a	  still	  a	  
perception	  that	  if	  certain	  types	  of	  technocratic	  information	  were	  made	  available,	  it	  would	  help	  
solve	  the	  values	  dispute.	  Wiser	  et	  al	  (1996)	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  this	  type	  of	  thinking:	  “To	  
ascertain	  the	  socially	  optimal	  level	  of	  renewables	  development	  or	  expenditure	  would	  require	  
detailed	  information	  on	  renewable	  energy	  costs	  and	  the	  societal	  benefits	  of	  renewables”	  (p.	  
11).	  While	  acknowledging	  that	  such	  calculations	  are	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  and	  that	  public	  
preferences	  are	  important,	  within	  the	  same	  breath,	  the	  authors	  imply	  that	  a	  technocratic	  
assessment	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  tradeoffs	  could	  have	  provided	  an	  answer	  to	  help	  reduce	  the	  political	  
debate:	  “Many	  of	  the	  MRPR	  opponents	  in	  California	  questioned	  whether	  the	  public	  benefits	  
provided	  by	  renewable	  energy	  are	  sufficient	  to	  merit	  additional	  financial	  support,	  whereas	  
MRPR	  proponents	  and	  others	  argued	  that	  the	  incremental	  benefits	  of	  renewable	  energy	  far	  
exceed	  the	  costs”	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1996,	  p.	  11).	  
4.3.2 A	  Political	  Economy	  Lens	  Illuminates	  Other	  Ways	  to	  Understand	  the	  Debate	  
When	  a	  debate	  about	  technology	  policy	  involves	  a	  debate	  about	  values,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  RPS	  and	  the	  surcharge	  fund,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  name	  and	  elucidate	  the	  “politics”	  of	  decision	  
making.	  However,	  this	  section	  also	  asserts	  that	  the	  conventional	  understanding	  of	  “politics”—
as	  an	  entrenched	  system	  in	  which	  those	  who	  hold	  the	  most	  power	  or	  have	  the	  largest	  purse	  
strings	  will	  always	  have	  the	  strongest	  influence	  on	  decision	  outcomes,	  leaving	  little	  room	  for	  
others	  to	  meaningfully	  engage—is	  insufficient	  to	  explain	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  contestation	  of	  
the	  two	  renewables	  policies.	  Though	  powerful	  voices	  favored	  the	  surcharge	  fund,	  it	  was	  not	  
always	  clear	  that	  it	  was	  the	  determinative	  choice	  during	  California’s	  restructuring	  process—just	  
as	  it	  was	  not	  always	  clear	  that	  the	  RPS	  was	  the	  immanent	  policy	  choice	  among	  U.S.	  states.	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Pielke’s	  idealized	  examples	  of	  Tornado	  Politics	  and	  Abortion	  Politics	  provide	  useful	  
conceptualizations	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  negotiations	  that	  must	  necessarily	  arise	  from	  different	  
decisions	  making	  contexts,	  but	  doesn’t	  delve	  into	  how	  such	  negotiations	  might	  look	  or	  what	  
forces	  shape	  their	  dynamics.	  This	  section	  explores	  how	  the	  “Abortion	  Politics”	  of	  California	  
renewable	  energy	  policy	  played	  out	  by	  explicating	  the	  rich,	  subterranean	  context	  in	  which	  it	  
took	  place.	  A	  political	  economy	  framework	  illuminates	  how	  the	  interaction	  of	  political	  
institutions,	  economic	  ideology,	  and	  various	  stakeholders	  with	  different	  orientations,	  values,	  
and	  obligations	  created	  a	  complex	  and	  dynamic	  environment	  for	  policy	  negotiation,	  one	  that	  
exhibited	  moments	  of	  contingency.	  	  Such	  moments	  allowed	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  new	  policy	  
instrument	  by	  policy	  entrepreneurs	  AWEA	  and	  UCS.	  Representatives	  of	  these	  organizations	  
were	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  gaps	  in	  a	  well-­‐established	  political	  landscape	  to	  gain	  traction	  for	  
their	  novel	  policy	  idea.	  	  
4.3.3 Divergent	  Industry	  and	  Organizational	  Interests	  
The	  restructuring	  process	  began	  with	  diverse	  stakeholders	  desiring	  conflicting	  interests.	  
Since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  new	  renewable	  development	  in	  California	  slowed	  immensely.	  Many	  of	  
the	  existing	  projects	  developed	  under	  PURPA	  QF	  contracts	  were	  reaching	  the	  end	  of	  the	  10-­‐
year	  term	  in	  which	  fixed-­‐price	  payments	  had	  been	  high	  because	  of	  oil	  cost	  projections;	  energy	  
payments	  thereafter	  would	  decrease	  substantially.	  The	  trend	  was	  exacerbated	  by	  utilities’	  
anticipation	  of	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  competitive	  market,	  which	  slowed	  their	  investments	  in	  
capital-­‐intensive	  projects	  such	  as	  renewables.	  Consequently,	  renewable	  energy	  and	  
environmental	  advocates	  called	  for	  policies	  to	  sustain	  the	  renewable	  industry	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  
supporting	  deregulation	  (Wise	  et	  al,	  1998).	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  utilities	  saw	  restructuring	  as	  an	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opportunity	  to	  absolve	  themselves	  from	  regulatory	  oversight	  to	  invest	  in	  renewables.	  In	  a	  
competitive	  market,	  they	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  guaranteed	  recovery	  of	  such	  capital-­‐intensive,	  
high-­‐risk	  projects	  the	  way	  they	  had	  been	  under	  rate	  regulation.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  California’s	  
restructuring	  process,	  SDG&E	  wanted	  to	  do	  away	  with	  renewables	  support	  completely.	  “San	  
Diego	  Gas	  and	  Electric	  managers	  said	  that	  if	  CPUC	  wanted	  to	  reduce	  retail	  prices,	  it	  should	  
eliminate	  social	  programs	  that	  raised	  them”	  (Hirsh,	  1999).	  All	  three	  IOUs	  argued	  that	  the	  high	  
avoided	  cost	  rates	  they	  were	  obligated	  to	  pay	  renewable	  generators	  under	  standard	  offer	  
contracts	  were	  a	  major	  component	  of	  California’s	  high	  electricity	  prices	  (K.	  Treleven	  and	  R.	  
Walther,	  personal	  communication,	  March	  31,	  2014;	  Hirsh,	  1999).41	  
4.3.4 Changing	  Politics	  with	  Changing	  Political	  Institutions	  	  
During	  the	  CPUC	  hearings	  in	  1995,	  Rader	  and	  Aitken	  had	  made	  strong	  impressions	  on	  
the	  Commission	  of	  the	  RPS	  and	  its	  benefits.	  Knight,	  a	  strong	  subscriber	  to	  free	  market	  
principles,	  particularly	  liked	  that	  the	  RPS	  would	  drive	  down	  the	  costs	  of	  renewables	  over	  time	  
and	  make	  them	  capable	  of	  competing	  unaided	  with	  fossil	  fuels.	  Another	  important	  factor	  was	  
that	  the	  CPUC	  had	  developed	  distaste	  for	  auctions	  from	  recent	  experiences	  with	  California’s	  
Biannual	  Resource	  Planning	  Update	  (BRPU),42	  making	  them	  more	  adverse	  to	  the	  auction	  
mechanism	  of	  the	  proposed	  surcharge	  fund	  (CPUC,	  1995c).	  On	  December	  20,	  1995,	  one	  and	  a	  
half	  years	  after	  it	  published	  the	  Blue	  Book,	  the	  CPUC	  issued	  its	  restructuring	  order.	  In	  it,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  One	  of	  the	  major	  reasons	  the	  CPUC	  wanted	  regulatory	  reform	  was	  to	  lower	  the	  state’s	  electricity	  prices,	  which	  in	  
1991	  ranged	  30	  to	  50	  percent	  above	  the	  national	  average	  (CPUC,	  1994).	  
42	  The	  1993	  BRPU	  was	  the	  final	  round	  of	  California’s	  Integrated	  Resource	  Planning	  (IRP)	  guide.	  Because	  additional	  
generation	  would	  be	  needed,	  it	  directed	  IOUs	  to	  bid	  for	  only	  “clean”	  renewable	  and	  natural	  gas	  resources;	  the	  
auction	  would	  yield	  the	  avoided	  cost	  payments	  under	  PURPA.	  The	  utilities	  appealed	  to	  FERC,	  arguing	  the	  CPUC	  had	  
made	  them	  pay	  avoided	  costs	  higher	  than	  what	  they	  would	  have	  for	  conventional	  fossil	  fuels.	  FERC	  agreed	  and	  in	  
March	  1995,	  the	  CPUC	  halted	  the	  auctions	  and	  authorized	  utilities	  to	  buy	  out	  already	  agreed-­‐upon	  contracts	  (CEC,	  
2004).	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Commission	  endorsed	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  RPS	  to	  meet	  the	  state’s	  resource	  diversity	  goals;	  
however,	  not	  all	  stakeholders	  agreed	  (CPUC,	  1995c).	  Six	  months	  earlier,	  the	  CPUC	  issued	  a	  
preliminary	  proposal	  that	  contained	  two	  plans	  because	  the	  Commissioners	  could	  not	  
unanimously	  agree	  on	  one.	  PoolCo,	  the	  majority	  proposal,	  envisioned	  electric	  generators	  selling	  
power	  to	  a	  single	  resource	  pool,	  from	  which	  suppliers	  would	  purchase	  power	  and	  then	  
distribute	  to	  customers.	  Direct	  Access,	  the	  minority	  plan,	  gave	  customers	  the	  ability	  to	  contract	  
directly	  for	  power	  directly	  with	  electricity	  generators.	  Both	  proposals	  recommended	  an	  RPS	  
mechanism	  for	  supporting	  long-­‐term	  renewables	  goals	  (which	  could	  be	  imposed	  on	  either	  
electricity	  generators	  or	  retail	  suppliers).43	  Feedback	  on	  the	  two	  proposals	  showed	  that	  many	  
environmental	  and	  renewables	  groups	  responded	  positively	  to	  the	  RPS	  recommendation,	  
including	  AWEA,	  UCS,	  NRDC,	  CEERT,	  and	  EDF.	  However,	  the	  Sierra	  Club	  and	  Independent	  
Energy	  Producers	  Association	  (IEP)	  advocated	  for	  another	  policy	  instrument:	  direct	  taxes	  that	  
would	  provide	  a	  “damage	  function”	  to	  value	  the	  damage	  caused	  by	  pollution	  and	  other	  
environmental	  impacts	  (CPUC,	  1995a).	  The	  CEC	  and	  all	  three	  IOUs,	  PG&E,	  SCE,	  and	  SDG&E,	  
opposed	  the	  RPS	  idea.	  The	  former	  two	  saw	  no	  need	  for	  policy	  intervention	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  
arguing	  that	  that	  existing	  electricity	  system	  was	  sufficiently	  diverse	  because	  renewables	  
projects	  held	  many	  of	  the	  existing	  PURPA	  QF	  contracts	  (CPUC,	  1995a;	  CPUC,	  1995c).	  The	  latter	  
two	  wanted	  to	  fund	  renewables	  through	  variations	  of	  a	  surcharge	  fund	  (CPUC	  1995c).	  EDF	  and	  
NRDC	  also	  supported	  having	  a	  policy	  where	  funding	  was	  specified	  (CPUC,	  1995c).44	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  The	  May	  proposals	  also	  suggested	  setting	  minimum	  diversity	  targets	  if	  necessary	  while	  the	  long-­‐term	  approach	  
is	  implemented	  (CPUC,	  1995a;	  CPUC,	  1995b).	  
44	  In	  testimony	  to	  the	  CPUC	  prior	  to	  the	  May	  proposals,	  EDF	  had	  also	  suggested	  a	  policy	  instrument	  similar	  to	  the	  
surcharge	  fund	  called	  a	  renewables	  “feebate”.	  A	  fee	  is	  charged	  on	  all	  electricity	  use	  and	  rebated	  to	  
environmentally-­‐friendly	  electricity	  generators	  (CPUC,	  1995a).	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environmental	  organizations	  didn’t	  view	  the	  proposed	  policy	  instruments	  as	  alternatives	  to	  
each	  other;	  they	  supported	  both	  (R.	  Cavanagh,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  16,	  2014).	  
In	  the	  December	  decision,	  the	  CPUC	  directed	  impacted	  stakeholders	  to	  meet	  as	  a	  	  
Renewables	  Working	  Group	  to	  elucidate	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  how	  the	  RPS	  would	  work.	  The	  
group	  met	  biweekly	  from	  January	  to	  August	  of	  1996	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1996).	  Input	  from	  the	  utilities,	  
power	  marketers,	  and	  others	  who	  would	  be	  obligated	  to	  fulfill	  the	  RPS	  helped	  clarify	  many	  
logistical	  and	  implementation	  details.	  Rader	  also	  collaborated	  with	  Brent	  Haddad,	  who	  had	  
experience	  working	  as	  a	  broker	  of	  emissions	  reduction	  credits,	  to	  specify	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  
RECs	  market	  (N.	  Rader,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  14,	  2014).	  However,	  as	  the	  final	  RWG	  
report	  in	  August	  1996	  showed,	  the	  group	  could	  not	  fundamentally	  agree	  on	  the	  same	  policy	  
instrument.	  The	  MRPR	  and	  surcharge	  fund	  proposals	  differed	  dramatically	  in	  two	  important	  
dimensions:	  1)	  the	  obligations	  of	  electricity	  suppliers	  and	  2)	  the	  cost	  associated	  with	  supporting	  
renewables.	  Under	  the	  MRPR	  instrument,	  electric	  retail	  providers	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  
ensuring	  they	  had	  enough	  RECs	  for	  compliance	  while	  under	  the	  surcharge	  instrument,	  they	  
would	  be	  responsible	  for	  collecting	  a	  nominal	  charge	  from	  electricity	  customers.	  Another	  key	  
difference	  was	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  specified	  a	  strict	  cost	  cap	  of	  funding	  at	  $100	  million/year.	  In	  
the	  RWG	  report,	  PG&E	  and	  SCE	  also	  sponsored	  an	  MRPR	  proposal	  that	  had	  a	  lower	  compliance	  
cost	  and	  required	  terminating	  the	  program	  if	  legislation	  was	  not	  enacted	  to	  apply	  the	  standard	  
to	  all	  retail	  suppliers.	  These	  provisions	  highlighted	  the	  IOUs’	  major	  concerns.	  Cost	  containment	  
was	  key	  for	  utility	  managers.	  Even	  in	  its	  earlier	  testimony	  to	  the	  CPUC,	  the	  IOUs	  had	  expressed	  
that	  funding	  for	  public	  goods	  programs—of	  which	  renewables	  was	  one	  part—must	  stay	  within	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a	  cap	  of	  3.3%	  of	  each	  utility’s	  revenue	  (CPUC,	  1995c).45	  Equally	  firm	  in	  their	  belief,	  AWEA	  and	  
UCS	  representatives	  argued	  they	  could	  not	  support	  a	  policy	  that	  did	  not	  guarantee	  a	  market	  
share	  for	  renewables.	  Rader	  argued	  that	  if	  electricity	  suppliers	  were	  obligated	  to	  meet	  a	  
standard,	  the	  industry	  would	  have	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  making	  sure	  to	  “get	  it	  right”	  with	  
renewables	  development	  (N.	  Rader,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  14,	  2014).	  An	  example	  
would	  be	  ensuring	  that	  power	  purchase	  agreements	  between	  renewable	  generators	  and	  buyers	  
contained	  the	  right	  provisions	  for	  the	  mutual	  success	  of	  both	  parties.	  RPS	  advocates	  contested	  
that	  the	  RPS	  policy	  would	  address	  institutional	  barriers	  renewables	  faced.	  With	  both	  sides	  
unwilling	  to	  compromise	  on	  their	  bottom	  line,	  a	  consensus	  could	  not	  be	  reached	  within	  the	  
RWG.	  
Meanwhile,	  the	  California	  legislature	  had	  grown	  progressively	  more	  concerned	  about	  
the	  CPUC	  moving	  forward	  with	  a	  restructuring	  order	  without	  legislative	  processes.	  By	  early	  
1996,	  lawmakers	  had	  considered	  a	  total	  of	  14	  bills	  dealing	  with	  various	  aspects	  of	  restructuring	  
(Hirsh,	  1999).	  “Months	  passed	  while	  the	  discussion	  meandered	  and	  faltered,	  and	  at	  one	  point	  it	  
even	  appeared	  that	  no	  law	  would	  be	  passed,”	  a	  San	  Francisco	  Gate	  article	  later	  wrote	  
(Berthelsen,	  2000).	  In	  the	  finals	  months	  of	  the	  1996	  California	  legislative	  session,	  a	  joint	  
Assembly	  and	  Senate	  conference	  committee	  convened	  to	  pull	  together	  the	  details	  of	  a	  
restructuring	  bill.	  The	  committee	  issued	  its	  conference	  report	  on	  August	  28,	  1996,	  using	  AB	  
1890	  as	  the	  conference	  vehicle	  for	  what	  would	  become	  a	  consequential	  piece	  of	  legislation.46	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  The	  other	  programs	  under	  the	  cap	  are	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  research	  and	  
development.	  The	  IOUs	  did	  not	  specify	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  3.3%	  among	  these	  programs.	  
46AB	  1890	  was	  originally	  a	  spot	  bill	  that	  permitted	  gas,	  electrical,	  heat,	  and	  water	  corporations	  to	  identify,	  as	  a	  
separate	  amount	  on	  billing	  statements,	  the	  cost	  of	  complying	  with	  government-­‐imposed	  mandates.	  A	  spot	  bill	  is	  
one	  that	  amends	  a	  code	  section	  in	  a	  non-­‐substantive	  way;	  it	  is	  usually	  introduced	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  germane	  vehicle	  
will	  be	  available	  at	  a	  later	  date,	  when	  the	  bill	  is	  amended	  with	  more	  substance.	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Senator	  Stephen	  Peace	  served	  as	  the	  chair	  of	  the	  six-­‐person	  conference	  committee	  in	  part	  
because	  he	  was	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Senate	  Committee	  on	  Energy,	  Utilities,	  and	  
Communications	  Committee	  at	  the	  time.	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  Peace	  had	  earned	  a	  
reputation	  for	  successfully	  leading	  another	  conference	  committee	  on	  a	  complex	  piece	  of	  
legislation	  that	  reformed	  workers’	  compensation	  system.	  The	  restructuring	  committee	  heard	  
the	  testimonies	  of	  all	  stakeholder	  interests	  as	  it	  negotiated	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  bill,	  but	  
participants	  confirmed	  the	  conference	  was	  a	  hurried	  and	  grueling	  process.	  “[It	  was]	  dubbed	  the	  
‘Steve	  Peace	  death	  march’	  for	  the	  legislator’s	  propensity	  to	  keep	  negotiators	  at	  the	  table	  late	  
into	  the	  night	  (Berthelsen,	  2000).47	  	  
In	  the	  legislative	  arena,	  those	  who	  opposed	  the	  RPS	  were	  able	  to	  exert	  much	  more	  
influence.	  “Large	  industrial	  customers,	  power	  marketers,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  utilities	  lobbied	  
against	  the	  MRPR	  bill	  within	  the	  California	  State	  Legislature”	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1996,	  p.	  18).	  They	  
were	  politically	  well-­‐connected	  and	  wielded	  substantial	  leverage	  through	  the	  campaign	  
fundraising	  process	  (K.	  Lipper,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  2,	  2014).	  When	  AWEA	  and	  UCS	  
testified	  in	  committee	  hearings	  on	  renewables,	  they	  were	  told	  by	  Peace	  that	  the	  RPS	  would	  not	  
be	  a	  viable	  statutory	  option	  because	  it	  was	  antithetical	  to	  the	  impending	  transition	  to	  a	  market	  
environment	  (N.	  Rader,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  14,	  2014).	  Peace	  was	  from	  San	  Diego	  
and	  SDG&E	  was	  one	  of	  his	  largest	  constituents.	  Rader	  recalled	  that	  the	  RPS	  was	  “dead	  on	  
arrival”	  in	  the	  legislature	  (N.	  Rader,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  14,	  2014).	  Concerned	  
whether	  renewables	  would	  receive	  any	  support	  at	  all,	  the	  large	  environmental	  organizations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  A	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  article	  characterized	  the	  process	  more	  strongly:	  “[It	  was]	  two	  weeks	  of	  horse-­‐trading	  into	  
the	  early	  morning	  hours	  by	  legislators,	  state	  utilities,	  big	  manufacturers,	  consumer	  groups	  and	  alternative	  energy	  
producers—all	  of	  which	  have	  a	  huge	  stake	  in	  the	  outcome”	  (Kraul,	  2006).	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and	  coalitions,	  such	  as	  EDF,	  NRDC,	  and	  CEERT,	  elected	  to	  support	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  (R.	  
Cavanagh,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  16,	  2014).	  On	  the	  conference	  committee	  was	  Senator	  
Sher,	  who,	  as	  an	  Assembly	  member	  in	  1994,	  had	  initiated	  the	  legislative	  oversight	  committee	  to	  
remind	  the	  CPUC	  of	  its	  legislative	  environmental	  obligations.	  Though	  Sher	  was	  new	  to	  the	  other	  
house,	  Senate	  President	  pro	  Tempore	  Bill	  Lockyer	  appointed	  him	  to	  the	  committee	  because	  of	  
the	  senator’s	  stalwart	  history	  in	  representing	  environmental	  interests.48	  However,	  given	  the	  
political	  dynamics	  of	  the	  legislature	  at	  the	  time	  and	  reinforcing	  nods	  from	  leading	  
environmental	  organizations,	  even	  Sher	  had	  to	  assent	  to	  the	  surcharge	  fund,	  believing	  it	  was	  
the	  best	  support	  renewables	  would	  be	  able	  to	  receive.	  Six	  years	  later,	  Sher	  would	  author	  
California	  Senate	  Bill	  1078,	  which	  successfully	  established	  an	  RPS	  requiring	  20%	  of	  retail	  
electricity	  to	  be	  sourced	  from	  renewables	  by	  2017	  (California	  Senate	  Bill	  1078,	  2002).	  
Like	  Sher,	  most	  stakeholders	  agreed	  to	  the	  restructuring	  bill	  because	  it	  contained	  
provisions	  to	  address	  some	  of	  their	  concerns,	  even	  if	  not	  all	  of	  them.	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  
legislation’s	  successful	  passage,	  Peace	  required	  all	  participants	  to	  testify	  their	  support	  at	  
Assembly	  and	  Senate	  floor	  hearings	  to	  confirm	  that	  their	  interests	  had	  been	  heard.	  This	  was	  the	  
other	  reason	  the	  process	  was	  termed	  the	  “Steve	  Peace	  death	  march”.	  Figure	  4	  shows	  a	  copy	  of	  
an	  artifact	  Peace	  presented	  during	  floor	  hearings	  to	  demonstrate	  popular	  backing	  of	  the	  bill.	  In	  
a	  news	  article	  published	  during	  the	  final	  days	  of	  the	  conference,	  a	  utility	  negotiator	  described	  
the	  immense	  pressure	  all	  parties	  felt	  at	  the	  time:	  “[Getting]	  all	  these	  disparate	  interests	  to	  get	  
together	  was	  a	  monumental	  task	  …	  They	  got	  together	  because	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  not	  
agreeing.	  Utilities	  want	  their	  CTC	  [competitive	  transition	  charge],	  small	  customers	  want	  to	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  A	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  article	  called	  Sher	  an	  “unabashed	  protector	  of	  nature”	  (Bailey,	  2009).	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sure	  they	  don't	  get	  the	  shaft,	  independent	  power	  producers	  want	  access	  to	  customers	  and	  
renewable	  power	  producers	  want	  subsidies	  …	  Everyone	  wants	  something,	  and	  everyone	  is	  
afraid	  that	  they	  will	  be	  the	  ones	  who	  don't	  get	  it”	  (Kraul,	  1996,	  p.	  D1).	  The	  bill	  passed	  	  
Figure	  4:	  Artifact	  Demonstrating	  Popular	  Support	  of	  AB	  1890	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unanimously	  in	  both	  houses	  on	  August	  31,	  1996	  and	  was	  signed	  into	  law	  the	  following	  month.	  
In	  an	  electric	  memorandum	  sent	  to	  friends	  and	  colleagues	  in	  September	  1996,	  Rader	  labeled	  
AB	  1890	  as	  “a	  deal,	  not	  a	  good	  policy”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Hirsh,	  1999,	  p.	  259,	  note	  111).	  
4.3.5 A	  Fractured	  Environmental	  Left	  (and	  Territorial	  Disputes)	  
Given	  the	  united	  pressure	  of	  the	  IOUs	  and	  large	  industrial	  customers	  in	  the	  California	  
legislature,	  it	  was	  critical	  that	  the	  environmental	  left	  worked	  together	  to	  univocally	  advocate	  
for	  the	  same	  renewables	  policy.	  Both	  at	  the	  organizational	  and	  representative	  level,	  AWEA	  and	  
UCS	  were	  new	  to	  the	  California	  energy	  policy	  arena.	  NRDC,	  EDF,	  and	  the	  Sierra	  Club	  had	  a	  long	  
history	  in	  California	  as	  key	  environmental	  players.	  NRDC	  and	  CEERT	  also	  established	  themselves	  
as	  credible	  negotiators	  with	  cross-­‐sectoral	  energy	  stakeholders	  and	  were	  well	  regarded	  by	  
many	  of	  the	  legislators	  in	  the	  conference	  committee	  (K.	  Lipper,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  
2,	  2014).	  Even	  though	  NRDC,	  CEERT,	  and	  EDF	  didn’t	  explicitly	  oppose	  the	  RPS	  concept,	  the	  
RPS—as	  a	  novel,	  even	  radical,	  policy	  instrument	  advocated	  by	  new	  players	  to	  the	  California	  
political	  stage—needed	  strong,	  unified	  environmental	  support	  to	  have	  had	  a	  chance	  in	  the	  
legislature.	  With	  the	  undue	  legislative	  sway	  of	  its	  opponents	  and	  without	  support	  from	  
influential	  environmental	  organizations,	  the	  RPS	  failed	  quickly.	  	  
Even	  though	  the	  environmental	  left	  advocated	  for	  renewables	  policy	  intervention,	  
differing	  value	  orientations	  and	  consequently	  different	  policy	  objectives	  fractured	  the	  group.	  
For	  example,	  environmental	  organizations	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  air	  and	  water	  pollution	  
(such	  as	  the	  Sierra	  Club)	  may	  have	  only	  been	  concerned	  about	  the	  environmental	  aspects	  of	  
renewables,	  and	  thus	  supported	  policies	  emphasizing	  these	  values	  (such	  as	  the	  “damage	  
function”	  approach).	  Renewable	  energy	  interests	  (such	  as	  AWEA	  and	  other	  renewables	  trade	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associations)	  advocated	  for	  the	  strongest	  support	  of	  their	  industry,	  emphasizing	  other	  benefits	  
renewables	  provided,	  including	  fuel	  diversity,	  risk	  mitigation	  of	  the	  electricity	  supply,	  economic	  
development,	  technology	  innovation,	  and	  long-­‐term	  cost	  reduction.	  	  
Political	  strategy	  and	  posturing	  also	  influenced	  differences	  within	  the	  political	  left.	  For	  
established	  environmental	  groups,	  their	  advocacy	  choices	  in	  California	  had	  implications	  for	  
their	  established	  image	  as	  effective	  negotiators	  at	  the	  regional	  and	  national	  level.	  For	  example,	  
NRDC’s	  Energy	  Program	  Co-­‐Director	  Ralph	  Cavanagh	  was	  working	  with	  IOUs	  in	  other	  states	  to	  
facilitate	  similar	  debates,	  thus	  NRDC’s	  willingness	  to	  compromise	  with	  the	  California	  IOUs	  had	  
implications	  for	  collaborative	  relationships	  elsewhere.49	  As	  well,	  EDF	  saw	  itself	  as	  an	  
organization	  that	  worked	  across	  sectoral	  interests	  and	  addressed	  environmental	  problems	  with	  
market-­‐based	  solutions;50	  thus,	  they	  advocated	  for	  an	  auction-­‐facilitated,	  surcharge-­‐funded	  
production	  incentive.	  Moreover,	  because	  these	  environmental	  organizations	  had	  been	  such	  
strong	  players	  in	  the	  California	  arena,	  the	  community	  was	  wary	  toward	  the	  new	  policy	  
entrepreneurs	  and	  had	  territorial	  incentive	  to	  not	  fully	  support	  their	  novel	  idea.	  As	  well,	  RPS	  
advocates	  had	  been	  so	  staunch	  in	  their	  belief	  that	  the	  RPS	  was	  the	  right	  policy	  instrument	  that	  
they	  were	  challenged	  to	  consider	  the	  concerns	  and	  obligations	  of	  the	  other	  groups.	  These	  
layers	  of	  differences	  made	  it	  hard	  for	  the	  environmental	  left	  to	  unite	  on	  a	  single	  policy	  
instrument.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  In	  his	  role	  as	  a	  member	  of	  U.S.	  Secretary	  of	  Energy	  Advisory	  Board	  from	  1993-­‐2003,	  Ralph	  Cavanagh	  worked	  
closely	  with	  a	  national	  network	  of	  utility	  interests	  that	  advocated	  a	  direct	  investment	  approach	  for	  renewables	  in	  
other	  states	  (R.	  Cavanagh,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  10,	  2014).	  
50	  See	  “Our	  mission	  and	  history”	  at	  http://www.edf.org/about/our-­‐mission-­‐and-­‐history.	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4.3.6 Institutional	  Differences	  (and	  Territorial	  Disputes)	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  consider	  how	  different	  conclusions	  were	  drawn	  for	  the	  same	  debate	  
in	  two	  institutions	  that	  were	  both	  trying	  to	  lay	  a	  framework	  for	  retail	  electricity	  restructuring.	  
One	  major	  difference	  that	  has	  been	  mentioned	  is	  that	  major	  IOUs	  and	  large	  electric	  customer	  
groups	  were	  able	  to	  exert	  much	  more	  influence	  in	  the	  legislature.	  Though	  utility	  and	  industry	  
interests	  can	  also	  lobby	  the	  CPUC,	  institutionally,	  the	  Commission	  is	  less	  susceptible	  to	  such	  
pressure.	  The	  agency’s	  obligations	  are	  to	  balance	  the	  interests	  of	  ratepayers	  and	  IOUs	  in	  their	  
rate	  regulation	  of	  the	  latter.	  Additionally,	  commissioners	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  governor	  and	  
can	  only	  serve	  additional	  terms	  through	  re-­‐appointment.	  In	  contrast,	  legislators	  are	  elected	  
officials	  who	  represent	  and	  advance	  the	  interests	  of	  their	  constituents,	  whom	  they	  also	  depend	  
on	  for	  re-­‐election.	  Legislators’	  decisions	  stem	  from	  many	  elements,	  including	  constituent	  
representation,	  campaign	  fundraising,	  negotiation	  dynamics	  with	  other	  legislators,	  the	  larger	  
political	  climate,	  51	  and	  mitigation	  of	  political	  backlash.	  Kip	  Lipper,	  who	  served	  as	  Sher’s	  Chief	  of	  
Staff	  in	  1996	  and	  has	  been	  working	  in	  California’s	  legislature	  for	  30	  years,	  observed:	  “When	  
things	  go	  wrong,	  the	  public	  doesn’t	  blame	  an	  obscure	  regulatory	  agency,	  they	  blame	  the	  
president,	  or	  Congress”	  (K.	  Lipper,	  personal	  communication,	  April	  2,	  2014).52	  	  
Conflicts	  between	  the	  two	  institutions	  added	  an	  additional	  dimension	  to	  the	  
institutions’	  differing	  choice	  of	  a	  renewable	  policy	  instrument.	  At	  the	  time,	  one	  observer	  
remarked	  that	  the	  Blue	  Book’s	  publication	  date	  of	  April	  20,	  1994	  was	  “a	  date	  that,	  one	  way	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  In	  this	  context,	  “larger	  political	  climate”	  refers	  to	  the	  party	  majority	  of	  the	  two	  houses	  and	  political	  orientation	  
of	  the	  governor.	  
52	  Lipper	  currently	  serves	  as	  Chief	  Policy	  Advisor	  of	  Energy	  and	  Environment	  to	  California	  Senate	  President	  Pro	  
Tempore	  Darrell	  Steinberg.	  A	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  article	  compared	  Lipper	  to	  Kobe	  Bryant	  or	  Magic	  Johnson	  for	  his	  
expertise	  and	  prowess	  in	  advancing	  some	  of	  the	  nation’s	  most	  groundbreaking	  environmental	  laws	  over	  his	  30	  
years	  as	  a	  statehouse	  staffer	  (Bailey,	  2009).	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another,	  will	  be	  long	  remembered	  in	  the	  annals	  of	  utility	  regulation”.53	  In	  it,	  the	  CPUC	  provided	  
the	  framework	  that	  set	  California’s	  electricity	  industry	  on	  a	  path	  where	  market	  mechanisms	  
would	  be	  used	  to	  achieve	  the	  goals	  and	  benefits	  it	  deemed	  important.	  The	  agency	  asserted	  it	  
would	  “look	  principally,	  though	  not	  blindly,	  to	  markets	  and	  the	  private	  sector,	  rather	  than	  to	  
command-­‐and-­‐control	  regulation,	  as	  the	  preferred	  means	  to	  achieve	  the	  goals	  established	  and	  
benefits	  identified”	  (CPUC,	  1994,	  p.	  9).	  However,	  many	  saw	  this	  as	  a	  way	  for	  the	  all-­‐Republican	  
Commission,	  driven	  by	  pure	  free	  market	  ideology,	  to	  undo	  the	  progressive	  command-­‐and-­‐
control	  policies	  previous	  Democratic	  legislators	  had	  enacted	  (K.	  Lipper,	  personal	  
communication,	  April	  2,	  2014).	  Many	  in	  the	  legislature	  saw	  a	  need	  to	  slow	  down	  the	  CPUC’s	  
process	  and	  become	  involved	  to	  ensure	  that	  key	  progressive	  policies	  would	  be	  preserved	  in	  
restructuring	  (B.	  Sher,	  personal	  communication,	  March	  31,	  2014;	  K.	  Lipper,	  personal	  
communication,	  April	  2,	  2014).	  A	  few	  months	  after	  the	  issuance	  of	  the	  Blue	  Book,	  a	  Los	  Angeles	  
Times	  article	  portrayed	  Peace’s	  distaste	  for	  the	  CPUC	  more	  sensationally.	  It	  was	  titled	  “Senator	  
Peace	  Plans	  Legislation	  to	  Pull	  the	  Plug	  on	  the	  PUC”	  and	  asserted:	  “As	  far	  as	  [the	  senator]	  is	  
concerned,	  the	  PUC	  has	  outlived	  its	  usefulness	  and	  is	  ‘way	  beyond	  reclamation’”	  (Groves,	  
1994).	  So	  although	  the	  CPUC	  had	  endorsed	  an	  RPS	  in	  its	  restructuring	  order,	  the	  conference	  
committee	  did	  not	  feel	  the	  need	  to	  heed	  the	  Commission’s	  recommendations	  on	  all	  accounts.	  
While	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  was	  much	  more	  conservative	  in	  its	  promotion	  of	  renewables,	  
the	  conference	  committee’s	  restructuring	  legislation	  offered	  more	  progressive	  policies	  in	  other	  
areas.	  This	  was	  especially	  true	  for	  the	  provisions	  addressing	  consumer	  protection:	  AB	  1890	  
guaranteed	  a	  10%	  rate	  reduction	  for	  residential	  and	  small	  business	  customers;	  created	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Draft	  letter	  from	  Amory	  Lovins,	  Vice	  President	  and	  Direct	  of	  Research,	  Rocky	  Mountain	  Institute,	  to	  Daniel	  
William	  Fessler,	  President,	  CPUC,	  12	  May	  1994,	  p.	  1	  (as	  cited	  in	  Hirsh,	  1999,	  p.	  389,	  note	  83).	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“firewall”	  so	  the	  recovery	  of	  “stranded	  costs”54	  could	  not	  shift	  between	  large	  and	  small	  
customers	  to	  protect	  the	  latter;	  and	  allowed	  publicly-­‐owned	  utilities	  the	  choice	  of	  participating	  
in	  the	  competitive	  market	  (CA	  AB	  1890,	  1996).	  However,	  to	  gain	  broad	  support	  for	  the	  
restructuring	  bill	  meant	  that	  negotiations	  required	  give	  and	  take.	  And	  the	  more	  progressive	  RPS	  
did	  not	  make	  the	  deal.	  
Figure	  5	  presents	  one	  dimension	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  debate	  by	  showing	  the	  
influence	  different	  groups	  of	  actors	  had	  on	  each	  decision	  making	  institution	  with	  respect	  to	  	  
Figure	  5:	  Interest	  Groups’	  Influence	  on	  Decision	  Making	  Institutions	  
	  
renewable	  energy	  advocacy.	  The	  width	  of	  the	  arrows	  indicates	  the	  relative	  degree	  of	  influence.	  	  
While	  others	  stakeholders	  were	  also	  engaged	  in	  the	  debate,	  such	  as	  large	  industrial	  customers,	  
this	  figure	  focuses	  on	  the	  groups	  that	  were	  most	  engaged	  in	  the	  deliberation	  process	  and	  that	  
have	  been	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  stars	  denote	  the	  most	  actively-­‐engaged	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  See	  footnote	  39.	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stakeholders.	  Figure	  6	  presents	  another	  dimension	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  debate	  by	  mapping	  
onto	  Figure	  3	  different	  stakeholder	  actions	  after	  a	  renewable	  policy	  decision	  was	  
recommended.	  The	  vertical	  placement	  of	  stakeholder	  actions	  correspond	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  
policy	  intervention	  stakeholders’	  stated	  preferences	  offered.	  The	  wide	  gray	  arrows	  indicate	  
Figure	  6:	  Renewable	  Policy	  Decisions	  As	  Results	  of	  Different	  Advocacy	  Efforts	  	  
	  
instances	  when	  stakeholder	  advocacy	  succeeded	  in	  altering	  the	  prevailing	  policy	  choice,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  “policy	  intervention”	  direction	  of	  the	  change.	  “Reading”	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	  political	  
economy	  debate	  shown	  in	  Figures	  5	  and	  6	  together	  help	  explain,	  for	  example,	  why	  the	  shift	  of	  
decision	  making	  from	  the	  CPUC	  to	  the	  legislature	  (and	  thus	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  influence)	  
compelled	  large	  environmental	  groups	  to	  shift	  their	  advocacy	  focus	  in	  the	  late	  summer	  of	  1996.	  
A	  political	  economy	  lens	  provides	  a	  way	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  was	  not	  a	  
predetermined	  outcome,	  but	  the	  result	  of	  the	  dynamic	  interactions	  of	  stakeholders	  and	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institutions—guided	  by	  different	  orientations,	  values,	  motivations,	  obligations,	  and	  
constraints—engaged	  in	  an	  ongoing	  negotiation	  of	  a	  ‘desirable’	  renewable	  energy	  policy.	  
	  
4.4 The	  Contingencies	  of	  Policy	  Making	  
The	  debate	  between	  the	  RPS	  and	  the	  surcharge	  fund	  as	  one	  about	  policy	  instrument	  
choice	  provides	  some	  insight	  into	  disagreements	  about	  renewable	  policy	  implementation	  and	  
public	  policy	  objectives.	  It	  may	  even	  allude	  to	  different	  stakeholders’	  perceptions	  of	  the	  costs	  
and	  benefits	  of	  renewables	  to	  them.	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  process	  of	  how	  one	  
instrument	  was	  selected	  over	  another—a	  choice	  that	  was	  ambiguous	  at	  many	  points	  during	  the	  
two	  plus-­‐year	  restructuring	  process.	  Understanding	  the	  political	  contingencies	  of	  how	  policy	  
choices	  are	  made	  is	  important	  because	  it	  shows	  gaps	  where	  opportunities	  for	  change	  can	  occur.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  California,	  the	  confluence	  of	  reforming	  a	  century-­‐old	  regulatory	  system,	  divergent	  
stakeholder	  interests,	  and	  different	  state	  institutional	  structures	  and	  objectives	  allowed	  a	  novel	  
policy	  idea	  to	  take	  hold.	  
In	  1994,	  green	  power	  marketing	  had	  seemed	  the	  most	  likely	  instrument	  to	  support	  
renewables	  during	  restructuring.	  Without	  legislative	  interference	  at	  this	  stage	  and	  the	  vocal	  
concerns	  of	  environmental	  and	  renewable	  energy	  organizations,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  the	  CPUC	  
would	  have	  considered	  options	  beyond	  a	  green	  power	  market.	  Because	  the	  legislature	  was	  
forceful	  in	  reminding	  the	  CPUC	  of	  its	  legislative	  mandates,	  the	  agency	  became	  more	  open	  to	  
policies	  that	  would	  provide	  stronger	  support	  for	  renewables.	  This	  created	  a	  space	  for	  other	  
instruments	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  debate.	  As	  new	  players,	  AWEA	  and	  UCS	  lacked	  influence	  in	  the	  
legislature.	  However,	  it	  was	  also	  because	  of	  their	  lack	  of	  ties	  to	  the	  existing	  political	  
	  	   57	  
arrangement	  that	  allowed	  them	  to	  introduce	  what	  was	  considered	  a	  radical	  and	  untested	  policy	  
instrument.	  	  
Overall,	  the	  CPUC’s	  restructuring	  decision	  relied	  more	  heavily	  on	  market	  principles	  while	  
the	  legislature’s	  restructuring	  bill	  contained	  more	  socially-­‐progressive	  policy	  mandates.	  So	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  CPUC	  chose	  to	  support	  the	  RPS	  concept—a	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  policy—seemed	  
incongruent	  to	  the	  two	  institutions’	  restructuring	  frameworks.	  This	  was	  due	  in	  part	  to	  
contingent	  events.	  In	  late	  1994,	  FERC	  reprimanded	  the	  agency	  for	  conducting	  auctions	  limited	  
to	  “clean”	  energy	  to	  set	  avoided	  cost	  rates	  (CEC,	  2004).	  This	  left	  the	  agency	  an	  aversion	  for	  
policy	  instruments	  that	  required	  administrative	  distribution	  oversight,	  such	  as	  the	  surcharge	  
fund.	  Understanding	  the	  framework	  of	  markets	  within	  which	  it	  had	  to	  work,	  AWEA	  designed	  a	  
policy	  with	  a	  strong	  market-­‐trading	  mechanism	  to	  allow	  the	  mandate	  to	  be	  fulfilled	  in	  the	  most	  
cost-­‐effective	  way.	  As	  policy	  entrepreneurs,	  AWEA	  and	  UCS	  stood	  ready	  to	  market	  for	  their	  
policy	  instrument	  to	  the	  CPUC	  during	  a	  ripe	  moment.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  ironic	  moments	  during	  
the	  process,	  Knight,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  anti-­‐regulatory	  commissioners,	  took	  to	  and	  advocated	  for	  
a	  control-­‐and-­‐command	  mandate	  within	  a	  board	  that	  believed	  that	  the	  pure	  free	  market	  would	  
provide	  for	  all.	  Briefly,	  it	  seemed	  that	  the	  IOUs,	  the	  strongest	  opponents	  to	  the	  RPS,	  were	  ready	  
to	  acquiesce	  to	  some	  version	  of	  the	  policy.	  In	  the	  RWG	  report,	  PG&E	  and	  SCE	  had	  sponsored	  
both	  an	  MRPR	  and	  surcharge	  fund	  proposal.	  Had	  the	  restructuring	  process	  not	  shifted	  to	  the	  
California	  legislature,	  the	  RPS	  may	  have	  gone	  into	  effect	  in	  1996	  for	  the	  CPUC-­‐jurisdictional	  
IOUs.	  	  
Like	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  CPUC,	  the	  legislature’s	  choice	  of	  a	  renewable	  policy	  
instrument	  was	  opposite	  to	  what	  one	  would	  expect.	  Though	  the	  restructuring	  legislation	  overall	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specified	  more	  progressive	  policies,	  the	  RPS	  was	  among	  those	  the	  legislature	  chose	  not	  to	  
support.	  Again,	  this	  was	  based	  on	  the	  contingency	  of	  the	  give-­‐and-­‐take	  negotiations	  in	  the	  
conference	  committee.	  Because	  different	  institutional	  forces	  shaped	  the	  commissioners’	  and	  
the	  legislators’	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  opponents	  of	  the	  RPS	  gained	  substantial	  leverage	  with	  
committee	  members.	  Of	  the	  six	  members,	  the	  conference	  committee	  chair	  had	  the	  most	  
substantive	  influence	  in	  shaping	  committee	  hearings	  and	  the	  language	  of	  the	  legislation.	  In	  an	  
almost	  uncanny	  twist,	  SDG&E,	  the	  utility	  that	  had	  most	  adamantly	  opposed	  the	  RPS,	  was	  a	  
constituent	  of	  the	  committee	  chair.	  As	  a	  result,	  California	  didn’t	  adopt	  the	  RPS	  in	  1996.	  
However,	  the	  political	  economy	  debate	  shows	  us	  the	  moments	  of	  contingency	  when	  the	  policy	  
outcome	  could	  have	  been	  very	  different.	  The	  dashed,	  rectangular	  boxes	  in	  Figure	  7	  visually	  
indicate	  these	  moments.	  
Figure	  7:	  Renewable	  Policy	  Decisions	  And	  Moments	  of	  Contingency	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5 THE	  CASE	  STUDY	  OF	  THE	  TEAX	  RPS	  
	  To	  better	  understand	  the	  California	  case	  study	  in	  the	  larger	  evolution	  of	  RPS	  adoption,	  
this	  section	  provides	  a	  briefer	  examination	  of	  a	  successful	  RPS	  case.	  The	  intent	  is	  that	  the	  
additional	  context	  will	  also	  help	  provide	  some	  lessons	  learned.	  The	  Texas	  RPS	  is	  widely	  
regarded	  as	  the	  textbook	  model	  of	  a	  successful	  RPS.	  Figure	  8	  shows	  total	  wind	  generation	  
capacity	  in	  California,	  Texas,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  between	  1999	  and	  2008	  (DOE	  EERE,	  2014).	  Many	  	  
Figure	  8:	  Installed	  Wind	  Capacity	  in	  California,	  Texas,	  and	  U.S.	  Between	  1999-­‐2008	  
	  
	  
have	  attributed	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  Texas’	  renewable	  energy	  industry	  since	  2001	  as	  the	  result	  
of	  its	  RPS,	  which	  was	  adopted	  in	  1999.	  Consequently,	  several	  studies	  have	  examined	  various	  
aspects	  of	  the	  Texas	  RPS	  (Hurlbut,	  2008;	  Rabe,	  2004;	  Rabe,	  2006;	  Langniss	  &	  Wiser,	  2003;	  
Ronald	  Lehr	  et	  al,	  2003).	  Texas	  also	  provides	  an	  interesting	  contrast	  to	  California	  because	  of	  the	  
states’	  divergent	  political	  priorities—and	  thus	  apparent	  willingness	  to	  adopt	  the	  RPS,	  which	  is	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generally	  perceived	  as	  a	  progressive	  policy.	  In	  1994,	  California’s	  strong	  renewables	  industry	  
presence	  and	  a	  history	  of	  environmentally-­‐progressive	  policies	  signaled	  favorable	  conditions	  for	  
RPS	  adoption.	  In	  contrast	  to	  California’s	  existing	  energy	  portfolio	  of	  more	  than	  10%	  renewables,	  
at	  the	  beginning	  of	  Texas’	  restructuring	  process,	  only	  about	  1%	  of	  the	  state’s	  76,000	  MW	  of	  
energy	  capacity	  came	  from	  renewables	  (Hurlbut,	  2008).55	  Texas	  did	  not	  have	  a	  strong	  history	  of	  
environmental	  concern;	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  it	  was	  a	  national	  leader	  in	  GHG	  and	  toxic	  emissions	  
levels,	  and	  several	  of	  its	  metropolitan	  areas	  suffered	  severe	  air	  pollution	  (Rabe,	  2004).	  Most	  
importantly,	  the	  state	  had	  historically	  built	  a	  strong	  economy	  around	  a	  carbon-­‐intensive	  energy	  
industry.	  Texas’	  aggressive	  energy	  development	  was	  made	  possible	  in	  part	  by	  maintaining	  
autonomy	  from	  various	  forms	  of	  regulatory	  oversight.	  The	  state	  didn’t	  create	  a	  public	  utilities	  
commission	  until	  1975	  and	  maintained	  a	  largely	  independent	  electricity	  grid	  that	  limited	  
interactions	  with	  other	  states	  and	  the	  federal	  government	  (Rabe,	  2004).56	  The	  enactment	  of	  an	  
RPS	  under	  such	  conditions	  was	  “no	  small	  task”	  (Rabe,	  2004	  p.	  53).	  
Barry	  Rabe	  and	  others	  attribute	  two	  key,	  high-­‐level	  reasons	  for	  the	  change	  in	  state	  
policy	  makers’	  attitudes	  toward	  energy	  conservation,	  energy	  efficiency,	  and	  renewable	  
generation.	  One	  was	  the	  progressive	  realization	  that	  the	  state’s	  fossil	  fuel	  resources	  were	  on	  
the	  decline	  and	  that	  diversification	  of	  its	  energy	  portfolio	  would	  not	  only	  be	  good	  for	  economic	  
development,	  but	  also	  maintain	  Texas’	  historical	  leadership	  as	  an	  energy	  state	  (Rabe,	  2004;	  R.	  
Swisher,	  personal	  communication,	  July	  9,	  2014).	  The	  second	  reason	  was	  a	  push	  from	  the	  Energy	  
Policy	  Act	  of	  1992	  for	  states	  to	  develop	  long-­‐term	  energy	  strategies	  in	  anticipation	  of	  new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  In	  1995,	  Texas	  ranked	  last	  among	  states	  in	  renewable	  energy	  generation	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  electricity	  
production	  (Rabe,	  2004).	  
56	  The	  Texas	  Interconnection	  is	  a	  power	  grid	  covering	  most	  of	  the	  state	  and	  is	  uniquely	  isolated	  from	  the	  Western	  
and	  Eastern	  Interconnections	  that	  services	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  U.S.	  (and	  Canada).	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forms	  of	  competition	  in	  energy	  markets.	  In	  1995,	  the	  state	  laid	  the	  foundations	  for	  competitive	  
wholesale	  electricity	  restructuring.	  That	  same	  year,	  the	  Public	  Utility	  Commission	  of	  Texas	  
(PUCT)	  launched	  an	  “integrated	  resource	  plan”	  that	  called	  for	  public	  engagement	  in	  the	  
planning	  process,	  providing	  an	  unexpected	  opportunity	  to	  raise	  awareness	  on	  renewable	  
energy	  (Rabe,	  2004).	  	  
The	  PUCT,	  through	  a	  series	  of	  coincidences,	  learned	  about	  the	  technique	  of	  deliberative	  
polling57	  and	  pushed	  utilities	  to	  use	  it	  to	  fulfill	  the	  resource	  plan’s	  public	  input	  requirement.	  
Between	  1996	  and	  1998,	  eight	  Texas	  electric	  utilities	  polled	  175-­‐250	  customers	  to	  determine	  
what	  energy	  options	  they	  preferred	  to	  meet	  their	  future	  electricity	  demands	  (Rabe,	  2004;	  Lehr	  
et	  al,	  2003).58	  The	  deliberative	  polls	  combined	  telephone	  surveys	  with	  town	  meetings	  where	  
customers	  learned	  more	  about	  energy	  choices	  from	  a	  panel	  of	  experts,	  with	  equal	  
representation	  from	  utilities	  and	  alternative	  energy	  interests.	  After	  deliberations	  on	  energy	  
issues	  with	  the	  panel	  and	  each	  other,	  the	  now	  more-­‐informed	  customers	  responded	  to	  the	  
survey	  again.59	  With	  respect	  to	  renewables	  and	  energy	  efficiency,	  the	  poll	  showed	  that	  
residential	  customers	  preferred	  these	  options	  to	  fossil	  fuel	  generation	  due	  to	  environmental	  
concerns	  (Rabe,	  2004;	  Lehr	  et	  al,	  2003).	  Additionally,	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  pay	  somewhat	  more	  
for	  these	  preferences.	  The	  results	  were	  surprising	  to	  both	  the	  utilities	  and	  the	  PUCT,	  but	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Deliberative	  polling	  was	  a	  technique	  developed	  by	  James	  Fishkin,	  a	  political	  theorist	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Texas	  
who	  had	  advocated	  for	  a	  more	  iterative	  approach	  to	  measuring	  public	  sentiment	  (Rabe,	  2004;	  Lehr	  et	  al,	  2003).	  
58	  The	  eight	  utilities	  were	  Central	  Power	  and	  Light	  (CPL),	  West	  Texas	  Utilities	  (WTU),	  and	  Southwestern	  Electric	  
Power	  Co.	  (SWEPCO),	  all	  subsidiaries	  of	  Central	  and	  Southwest	  Utilities	  (CSW),	  and	  El	  Paso	  Electric,	  Entergy	  Gulf	  
States,	  Houston	  Lighting	  and	  Power	  (HL&P),	  Texas	  Utilities	  (TU),	  and	  Southwestern	  Public	  Service	  (SPS).	  
59	  For	  additional	  details	  about	  the	  design	  and	  results	  of	  the	  research,	  see	  Lehr	  et	  al,	  2003.	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impact	  they	  had	  on	  these	  organizations’	  level	  of	  interest	  in	  renewables	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  
was	  “transformational”	  (R.	  Swisher,	  personal	  communication,	  July	  9,	  2014).60	  	  
Momentum	  grew	  quickly	  as	  a	  coalition	  of	  renewables	  advocates	  worked	  with	  key	  
agency	  officials	  to	  advance	  support	  for	  renewables	  from	  a	  green	  power	  market	  to	  a	  more	  
binding	  mandate.	  EDF	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  advocating	  for	  the	  Texas	  RPS;	  it	  was	  trusted	  by	  
utilities	  based	  on	  its	  work	  in	  other	  state	  restructuring	  negotiations	  and	  its	  key	  representative	  
had	  a	  well-­‐established	  history	  in	  the	  state’s	  policy	  arena.	  The	  RPS	  was	  passed	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
state’s	  restructuring	  legislation,	  Senate	  Bill	  7,	  in	  May	  1999.	  It	  mandated	  for	  2,000	  MW	  of	  new	  
renewable	  energy	  capacity	  by	  2009,	  along	  with	  a	  graduated	  timeline	  (Texas	  Senate	  Bill	  7,	  1999).	  
Rader	  recalled	  that	  Wiser	  took	  the	  RPS	  blueprint	  from	  the	  CPUC	  RWG	  report	  to	  help	  with	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  RPS	  in	  Texas	  (N.	  Rader,	  personal	  communication,	  July	  22,	  2014).	  The	  
PUCT	  designed	  the	  RPS	  as	  an	  integrated	  package	  with	  a	  well-­‐defined	  RECs	  trading	  system	  and	  a	  
green	  power	  market;	  the	  Texas	  Commission	  had	  grappled	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  California	  
policy	  makers	  had	  with	  fitting	  a	  policy	  mandate	  into	  a	  competitive	  market	  framework.	  “The	  
PUCT	  approached	  the	  test	  by	  designing	  the	  RPS	  as	  a	  springboard	  for	  a	  green-­‐power	  market.	  The	  
RPS	  seeded	  demand	  on	  the	  expectation	  that	  over	  time	  competition	  for	  the	  RPS	  will	  reduce	  
costs,	  with	  lower	  costs	  leading	  to	  greater	  voluntary	  demand	  and	  greater	  economies	  of	  scale”	  
(Hurlbut,	  2008,	  p.	  148).	  
Though	  substantial	  legislation	  momentum	  built	  after	  deliberative	  polling	  confirmed	  
customer	  preferences,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Texas	  RPS	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  decade	  of	  advocacy	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  One	  state	  agency	  official	  recalled	  that	  while	  commissioners	  had	  previously	  dismissed	  environmental	  and	  
renewable	  advocacy	  as	  a	  special	  interest,	  deliberative	  polling	  “gave	  them	  star	  power,	  and	  they	  really	  liked	  it.	  
[Commission	  Chair]	  Pat	  Woods	  was	  impressed;	  he	  saw	  this	  as	  something	  the	  public	  wanted	  once	  they	  knew	  what	  
was	  involved”	  (Rabe,	  2004,	  p.	  56-­‐57).	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education	  by	  a	  dedicated	  core	  of	  renewables	  advocates	  (of	  which	  the	  deliberative	  polling	  
program	  was	  one	  part)	  (Rabe,	  2004;	  R.	  Swisher,	  personal	  communication,	  July	  9,	  2014).	  Wind	  
researchers	  at	  West	  Texas	  A	  &	  M	  University's	  Alternative	  Energy	  Institute	  studied	  the	  state’s	  
wind	  energy	  potential	  and	  provided	  critical	  data	  for	  developers	  considering	  wind	  projects	  
(National	  Renewable	  Energy	  Laboratory,	  2000).	  Private-­‐public	  partnerships	  under	  Governor	  
Anne	  Richards’	  administration	  built	  the	  state’s	  first	  commercial	  wind	  facility,	  the	  35-­‐MW	  Texas	  
Wind	  Power	  Project.61	  “By	  today’s	  scale,	  the	  project	  is	  small,	  but	  it	  was	  “enormous	  at	  the	  time”	  
because	  it	  provided	  an	  example	  to	  which	  advocates	  could	  point	  to	  show	  the	  potential	  of	  wind	  
power	  in	  their	  state	  (R.	  Swisher,	  personal	  communication,	  July	  9,	  2014).	  Two	  other	  key	  
elements	  helped	  advance	  the	  RPS	  politically.	  The	  first	  was	  proponents’	  conscious	  choice	  to	  
emphasize	  renewables’	  economic	  development	  and	  long-­‐term	  reliability	  benefits	  over	  climate	  
change	  impacts	  (Rabe,	  2004).	  The	  second	  was	  compromise	  on	  a	  modest	  standard	  and	  to	  
exempt	  municipal	  cooperatives	  and	  rural	  cooperatives	  from	  the	  mandate	  (and	  retail	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  “In	  the	  early	  1990s,	  U.S.	  Windpower	  (later	  renamed	  Kenetech	  Windpower)	  was	  the	  largest	  manufacturer	  of	  wind	  
turbines	  in	  the	  world.	  	  They	  were	  also	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  aggressive	  U.S.	  developer	  of	  wind	  projects.	  	  Once	  the	  
California	  wind	  boom	  of	  the	  1980s	  was	  over,	  the	  company	  looked	  for	  other	  promising	  wind	  markets.	  	  Given	  its	  
enormous	  wind	  resource	  and	  history	  as	  an	  energy	  state,	  Texas	  stood	  out.	  	  U.S.	  Windpower	  hired	  a	  well-­‐connected	  
political	  operative	  to	  approach	  the	  administration	  of	  Govenor	  Ann	  Richards,	  and	  a	  plan	  was	  agreed	  to	  build	  the	  
first	  commercial	  wind	  facility	  in	  Texas	  in	  Culberson	  County”	  (R.	  Swisher,	  personal	  communication,	  July	  9,	  2014).	  
Lower	  Colorado	  River	  Authority,	  a	  public	  utility,	  purchased	  the	  power	  from	  the	  facility	  until	  its	  closing	  in	  May	  2014	  
(Lower	  Colorado	  River	  Authority,	  n.d.).	  
62	  The	  additional	  2000	  MW	  of	  renewables	  capacity	  required	  by	  the	  RPS	  amounted	  to	  less	  than	  3%	  of	  Texas’	  existing	  
energy	  portfolio.	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6 CONCLUSIONS	  
This	  thesis	  shows	  it	  is	  equally	  important	  to	  explain	  how	  a	  policy	  idea	  came	  to	  be	  through	  
the	  lens	  of	  a	  policy	  instrument	  debate	  as	  it	  is	  to	  elucidate	  how	  the	  debate	  manifested	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  surrounding	  political	  economy.	  The	  proliferation	  of	  the	  RPS	  has	  attested	  to	  the	  
strength	  and	  flexibility	  of	  its	  design	  in	  both	  restructuring	  and	  non-­‐restructuring	  contexts.	  
However,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  RPS	  in	  California,	  a	  policy	  instrument’s	  design	  
alone	  cannot	  speak	  to	  the	  success	  of	  its	  adoption,	  much	  less	  to	  that	  of	  its	  diffusion.	  A	  
contestation	  over	  policy	  instruments	  is	  necessarily	  embedded	  in	  a	  deeper	  substrate	  of	  
pluralistic	  values.	  This	  thesis	  characterizes	  political	  economy	  not	  merely	  as	  ‘politics’—a	  
disempowering	  and	  often	  predictable	  process	  involving	  hushed	  exchanges	  behind	  closed	  
doors—but	  as	  a	  negotiated	  space	  of	  institutions	  and	  actors	  who	  are	  guided	  by	  different	  
orientations,	  values,	  motivations,	  obligations,	  and	  constraints,	  and	  influenced	  by	  dominant	  
modes	  of	  thinking	  and	  problem	  solving.	  The	  political	  economy	  lens	  illuminates	  the	  policy	  
making	  process	  in	  California	  (and	  elsewhere)	  as	  power-­‐laden,	  territorial,	  well-­‐intended,	  
constrained,	  misguided,	  strategic,	  and	  contingent—giving	  way	  to	  occasional	  gaps	  in	  the	  political	  
landscape	  to	  allow	  for	  potential	  change.	  
	  
6.1 Case	  Study	  Conclusions	  
From	  a	  policy	  entrepreneurship	  perspective,	  this	  thesis	  extracts	  some	  observations	  and	  
lessons	  learned	  afforded	  by	  hindsight	  and	  a	  comparative	  case	  study.	  In	  terms	  of	  lessons	  
learned,	  there	  are	  several.	  First,	  that	  if	  one	  wants	  to	  advance	  a	  policy	  idea	  such	  as	  the	  RPS,	  it	  is	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important	  to	  engage	  in	  both	  the	  policy	  instrument	  and	  political	  economy	  debates.	  A	  
substantive	  policy	  provides	  the	  foundational	  mechanism	  toward	  accomplishing	  a	  policy	  goal—
in	  this	  case,	  to	  carve	  out	  a	  market	  share	  for	  renewable	  technologies.	  However,	  for	  policy	  
entrepreneurs	  to	  advance	  their	  agenda,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  values	  and	  
constraints	  of	  the	  affected	  stakeholders.	  AWEA	  and	  UCS	  representatives	  were	  reticent	  to	  
compromises,	  believing	  that	  only	  a	  strong	  RPS	  would	  provide	  a	  guarantee	  for	  the	  renewables	  
industry.	  It	  appeared	  they	  privileged	  the	  policy	  instrument	  dimensions	  of	  the	  debate.	  A	  close	  
observer	  of	  the	  debate	  at	  the	  time	  noted	  that	  the	  representatives	  were	  very	  successful	  at	  
winning	  support	  at	  the	  CPUC,	  where	  there	  was	  more	  emphasis	  on	  policy	  substance,	  but	  less	  so	  
in	  the	  legislature,	  when	  more	  politics	  came	  into	  play.	  Rader	  herself	  commented	  that	  AB	  1890	  
was	  a	  deal	  rather	  than	  good	  policy.	  Pielke	  (2003)	  asserts	  that	  “in	  situations	  of	  political	  conflict	  
about	  the	  means	  or	  ends	  that	  a	  policy	  is	  to	  achieve,	  politics	  will	  always	  and	  necessarily	  ‘trump’	  
science	  simply	  because	  science	  does	  not	  compel	  action.”	  Similarly,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  win	  a	  debate	  
with	  low	  values	  consensus	  by	  focusing	  on	  arguments	  about	  policy	  instruments.	  Renewables	  
advocates	  in	  Texas	  seemed	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  importance	  in	  appealing	  to	  stakeholder	  
values:	  they	  downplayed	  the	  environmental	  aspects	  of	  renewable	  energy	  expansion	  and	  
accentuated	  instead	  its	  economic	  and	  energy	  reliability	  benefits.	  	  
This	  thesis	  does	  not	  necessarily	  suggest	  that	  all	  stakeholder	  values	  should	  be	  given	  equal	  
weight	  or	  that	  the	  dynamics	  of	  a	  given	  political	  environment	  is	  necessarily	  just.	  However,	  to	  
effectively	  strategize,	  policy	  proponents	  must	  first	  understand	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  
policy-­‐making	  process	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  to	  appeal	  to	  stakeholders	  based	  on	  their	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values,	  compromise	  the	  strength	  of	  their	  policy	  instrument,	  seek	  further	  alliances,	  or	  leverage	  
other	  modes	  of	  support.	  	  
With	  this	  in	  mind,	  a	  second	  lesson	  is	  that	  a	  broad	  coalition	  is	  needed	  to	  successfully	  
champion	  a	  policy.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  Texas	  RPS	  represented	  the	  consorted	  effort	  of	  
renewables	  advocates	  to	  engage	  actors	  across	  different	  sectors,	  including	  decision	  makers,	  key	  
players	  in	  state	  agencies,	  well-­‐established	  interest	  groups,	  researchers,	  and	  the	  public.	  To	  
enable	  “buy-­‐in”,	  proponents	  appealed	  to	  stakeholders’	  values	  through	  strategic	  policy	  
labeling.63	  Broadening	  policy	  appeal	  could	  have	  mitigated	  some	  RPS	  opposition	  in	  California	  
that	  was	  grounded	  in	  the	  perception	  that	  it	  heavily	  favored	  the	  renewables	  industry.64	  	  
To	  gain	  enough	  political	  support,	  policy	  entrepreneurs	  may	  also	  have	  to	  make	  more	  
substantive	  sacrifices,	  such	  as	  supporting	  a	  more	  modest	  mandate	  or	  agreeing	  to	  certain	  
exemptions.	  A	  third	  lesson	  here	  is	  that	  compromises	  may	  be	  required	  for	  policy	  enactment,	  but	  
it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  policy	  objectives	  won’t	  be	  achieved.	  In	  Texas,	  an	  integrated	  
package	  of	  a	  modest	  RPS	  and	  a	  green	  power	  market	  supported	  the	  market	  framework	  of	  
restructuring,	  eased	  utilities’	  cost	  impacts,	  and	  gave	  room	  for	  a	  voluntary	  renewables	  market	  to	  
grow.	  California	  advocates	  could	  have	  considered	  a	  similar	  strategy	  or	  addressed	  IOU	  concerns	  
by	  negotiating	  a	  more	  amenable	  cost	  of	  compliance.	  Successful	  development	  of	  wind	  projects	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Rabe	  (2004)	  describes	  policy	  labeling	  as	  the	  use	  of	  “explicit	  language	  used	  to	  describe	  policies	  that	  may	  be	  
attempted,	  given	  the	  opportunities	  provided	  (or	  constraints	  imposed)	  by	  issue	  framing,	  ...	  the	  most	  common	  way	  
in	  which	  a	  policy	  issue	  has	  come	  to	  be	  characterized	  in	  a	  given	  political	  system”	  (p.	  27-­‐29).	  
64	  Many	  stakeholders	  perceived	  that	  the	  RPS	  would	  benefit	  the	  renewables	  industry	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  IOUs,	  power	  
marketers,	  and	  large	  industrial	  customers	  (Wiser	  et	  al,	  1996).	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in	  Texas	  attested	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  RPS	  as	  a	  policy,	  enabling	  advocates	  to	  push	  for	  and	  pass	  
a	  higher	  mandate	  in	  2005.65	  
“Home	  grown”	  advocacy	  efforts	  coupled	  with	  demonstrated	  public	  support	  made	  it	  
challenging	  for	  Texas	  utilities	  and	  regulators	  to	  deny	  a	  policy	  that	  was	  a	  vocalized	  preference	  of	  
so	  many	  stakeholders.	  Legislators	  also	  needed	  a	  nod	  of	  approval	  from	  environmental	  and	  
special	  interest	  groups	  for	  their	  restructuring	  bill.	  A	  fourth	  lesson,	  related	  to	  those	  above,	  is	  
that	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  engage	  the	  support	  of	  well-­‐established	  and	  trusted	  advocacy	  groups.	  One	  of	  
the	  biggest	  challenges	  faced	  by	  AWEA	  and	  UCS	  representatives	  was	  their	  arrival	  as	  new	  players	  
to	  a	  well-­‐carved	  (and	  territorial)	  policy	  space.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Texas,	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  
California	  RPS	  advocates	  “parachuted	  in”	  with	  a	  new	  policy	  idea	  that	  largely	  advocated	  for	  their	  
own	  interests	  made	  it	  easy	  for	  legislators	  to	  dismiss	  the	  RPS.	  Whether	  this	  perception	  is	  
justified	  or	  not,	  the	  representatives	  critically	  needed	  the	  support	  of	  organizations	  like	  NRDC,	  
EDF,	  and	  CEERT	  for	  the	  RPS	  to	  have	  a	  fighting	  chance	  in	  the	  legislature.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  formidable	  political	  adversity	  they	  faced	  
(and	  limited	  by	  resource	  constraints),	  what	  the	  AWEA	  and	  UCS	  representatives	  accomplished	  in	  
California	  was	  enormous.	  As	  policy	  generators,	  they	  created	  a	  robust	  policy	  instrument:	  the	  
design	  of	  the	  RPS	  as	  a	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  policy	  provided	  a	  guarantee	  for	  renewable	  
development	  while	  its	  RECs	  component	  made	  the	  policy	  palatable	  for	  the	  larger	  restructuring	  
landscape.	  As	  policy	  entrepreneurs,	  the	  RPS	  proponents	  took	  advantage	  of	  opportunities	  that	  
arose	  to	  engage	  key	  decision	  makers	  to	  champion	  the	  RPS.	  As	  well,	  they	  pushed	  the	  larger	  
community	  to	  think	  differently	  about	  the	  kinds	  of	  policy	  instruments	  needed	  to	  sustain	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  In	  August	  2005,	  Texas	  Senate	  Bill	  20	  increased	  the	  mandate	  to	  5,880	  MW	  by	  2015,	  with	  a	  target	  of	  10,000	  MW	  
by	  2025	  (Texas	  Senate	  Bill	  20,	  2005).	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grow	  the	  development	  of	  renewables.	  They	  came	  very	  close	  to	  winning	  and	  had	  things	  been	  a	  
little	  different,	  California	  might	  have	  been	  the	  first	  RPS	  state.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  was	  there	  that	  
Rader	  and	  Aitken	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  what	  would	  become	  the	  renewable	  energy	  policy	  
choice	  of	  U.S.	  states	  today.	  
	  
6.2 Broader	  Conclusions	  
Three	  broader	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  investigation.	  This	  first	  is	  that	  
examining	  the	  genealogy	  of	  how	  a	  policy	  instrument	  came	  to	  be	  affords	  a	  critical	  perspective	  
that	  is	  often	  obscured	  by	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  successful	  and	  the	  now.	  No	  doubt,	  there	  is	  need	  for	  
best	  practices	  research,	  but	  historicizing	  policy	  ideas	  can	  shift	  the	  way	  we	  think	  about	  their	  
importance.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  RPS,	  a	  genealogical	  investigation	  reveals	  the	  policy’s	  origin	  was	  
adversarial	  in	  nature.	  Both	  Hurlbut	  and	  Rabe	  overlook	  this	  point	  in	  their	  case	  study	  of	  Texas.	  
Rabe	  claims	  the	  RPS	  was	  conceptualized	  abroad.	  Such	  brevity	  in	  explaining	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  
RPS	  makes	  it	  seem	  as	  though	  the	  policy	  just	  ‘fell’	  into	  renewables	  advocates’	  laps.	  Hurlbut	  
claims	  that	  restructuring	  critically	  offered	  an	  issue	  vehicle	  that	  allowed	  the	  RPS	  to	  gain	  
visibility.66	  The	  irony	  that	  goes	  unacknowledged	  with	  both	  these	  views	  is	  that	  the	  restructuring	  
movement	  necessitated	  the	  development	  of	  the	  RPS	  policy	  as	  we	  know	  it	  today.	  Focusing	  only	  
on	  narratives	  where	  a	  policy	  instrument	  succeeds	  has	  a	  way	  of	  naturalizing	  the	  way	  we	  think	  
about	  its	  success	  as	  given,	  allowing	  us	  to	  quickly	  forget	  what	  a	  radical	  instrument	  the	  RPS	  was	  
in	  trying	  to	  accomplish	  something	  that	  was	  against	  the	  grain	  of	  dominant	  thinking.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  “If	  one	  factor	  were	  crucial	  to	  the	  political	  fortunes	  of	  the	  RPS	  in	  Texas	  Legislature,	  it	  would	  be	  strategic	  linkage.	  
In	  all	  likelihood,	  the	  Texas	  RPS	  never	  would	  have	  happened	  as	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  proposition	  in	  1999	  …	  By	  associating	  
the	  RPS	  with	  related	  issues	  that	  had	  ascended	  high	  on	  the	  legislative	  agenda,	  however,	  proponents	  successfully	  
overcame	  political	  opposition	  and	  secured	  a	  visible,	  meaningful	  place	  for	  renewable	  energy	  in	  the	  state's	  overall	  
energy	  development	  plan”	  (Hurlbut,	  2008,	  p.	  132).	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Second,	  it	  seems	  a	  larger	  theme	  that	  emerges	  from	  these	  case	  studies	  is	  that	  the	  
process	  for	  getting	  a	  policy	  idea	  to	  gain	  traction	  is	  iterative,	  built	  on	  a	  foundation	  of	  gains	  made	  
here	  and	  there—most	  of	  them	  small.	  Policy	  entrepreneurs	  pushed	  for	  and	  took	  advantage	  of	  
opportunities	  to	  not	  only	  introduce,	  but	  also	  cultivate	  confidence	  in	  a	  different	  policy	  idea.	  In	  
California,	  Rader	  and	  Aitken	  maintained	  their	  utmost	  belief	  in	  the	  RPS	  and	  its	  design—perhaps	  
to	  the	  detriment	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  compromise	  on	  other	  policy	  instruments.	  However,	  had	  they	  
not	  swayed	  the	  CPUC,	  a	  working	  group	  of	  divergent	  stakeholders	  would	  not	  have	  convened	  to	  
work	  out	  many	  implementation	  details	  of	  the	  RPS,	  including	  its	  critical	  RECs	  trading	  mechanism.	  
Such	  a	  valuable	  blueprint	  may	  not	  have	  been	  available	  to	  other	  states	  that	  subsequently	  and	  
successfully	  adopted	  the	  RPS.	  In	  Texas,	  a	  wind	  turbine	  manufacturer	  pushed	  to	  build	  the	  state’s	  
first	  commercial	  wind	  facility.	  Though	  it	  was	  small,	  along	  with	  the	  wind	  data	  provided	  by	  Texas	  
wind	  scholars,	  it	  showed	  the	  promise	  of	  what	  a	  booming	  and	  “home	  grown”	  renewables	  
industry	  could	  look	  like.	  RPS	  advocates	  made	  another	  gain	  by	  compromising	  on	  a	  modest	  RPS	  to	  
ensure	  its	  enactment.	  In	  exchange	  for	  what	  seemed	  like	  a	  concession,	  they	  made	  a	  bid	  that	  the	  
demonstrated	  success	  of	  the	  RPS	  would	  give	  future	  advocates	  a	  chance	  to	  push	  for	  a	  higher	  
Texas	  mandate,	  and	  proponents	  elsewhere	  a	  bona	  fide	  example	  to	  which	  they	  could	  point.	  By	  
accounting	  for	  how	  a	  policy	  instrument	  came	  to	  be,	  this	  thesis	  shows	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  long	  
history	  of	  entrepreneurs	  who	  took	  advantage	  of	  gaps	  and	  contingencies	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  
power	  of	  a	  novel	  policy	  idea.	  	  
Finally,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  what	  gave	  way	  to	  a	  space	  in	  which	  this	  work	  
could	  be	  done	  was	  rare.	  The	  strands	  of	  deregulation	  and	  renewables	  development	  are	  
intertwined:	  they	  both	  emerged	  from	  policies	  that	  moved	  the	  U.S.	  electricity	  sector	  away	  from	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a	  utility	  consensus	  that	  had	  governed	  it	  for	  over	  a	  century.	  A	  series	  of	  federal	  statutes	  created	  
the	  framework	  for	  wholesale	  energy	  competition,	  leaving	  the	  prerogative	  of	  retail	  competition	  
to	  the	  states.	  The	  same	  statutes	  also	  carved	  a	  space	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  independent	  power	  
producers,	  including	  renewable	  energy	  generators.	  Restructuring	  came	  to	  a	  head	  in	  California	  
with	  a	  growing	  renewable	  energy	  industry	  that	  had	  much	  to	  lose.	  While	  retail	  restructuring	  
threatened	  to	  marginalize	  renewables,	  it	  also	  offered	  opportunity	  for	  a	  larger	  group	  of	  
stakeholders	  to	  take	  up	  a	  space	  that	  was	  historically	  the	  exclusive	  jurisdiction	  of	  public	  utilities	  
commissions.	  Groups	  with	  diverging	  interests	  were	  able	  to	  negotiate	  how	  they	  valued	  
renewables,	  and	  subsequently,	  what	  policy	  instruments	  could	  be	  used	  to	  support	  them.	  In	  
California,	  restructuring	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  to	  launch	  a	  novel	  policy	  idea.	  In	  Texas,	  
restructuring	  provided	  a	  platform	  to	  advance	  it.	  Though	  retail	  restructuring	  may	  have	  taken	  on	  
different	  meaning	  for	  renewables	  in	  different	  contexts,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  
restructuring	  provided	  a	  rare	  moment67	  that	  departed	  from	  the	  “deep,	  settled	  grooves”	  of	  how	  
we	  think	  about	  electricity	  governance	  (Boyd,	  2012,	  p.	  904).	  Ironically—for	  now—widespread	  
RPS	  adoption	  has	  attested	  to	  the	  policy’s	  success	  over	  the	  retail	  restructuring	  efforts	  that	  








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  In	  writing	  about	  critical	  legal	  history,	  Christopher	  Tomlin	  (2012)	  notes:	  “Moments	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  
opportunity,	  in	  other	  words,	  are	  not	  constant	  but	  fleeting—fragile,	  fragmentary,	  and	  easily	  overborn.	  Moments	  
when	  history	  breaks	  free	  of	  repetitions	  and	  regularities	  are	  rare.	  They	  demand	  a	  means	  of	  recognition	  that	  can	  
explain	  their	  rarity	  rather	  than	  one	  that	  treats	  them	  as	  immanent”	  (p.	  36).	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8 APPENDICES	  
8.1 Research	  Design	  and	  Methodology	  
	   My	  research	  employs	  interviews,	  primary,	  and	  secondary	  literatures	  as	  the	  means	  of	  
empirical	  investigation	  and	  uses	  an	  interdisciplinary	  framework	  that	  emphasizes	  the	  political	  
economy	  tradition.	  A	  reflexive	  model	  of	  science	  described	  by	  Michael	  Burawoy	  (2009)	  informs	  
my	  methodological	  approach.	  Such	  a	  reflexive	  model	  is	  premised	  on	  a	  researcher’s	  
participation	  in	  the	  world	  they	  are	  studying.	  Objectivity	  in	  this	  model	  is	  not	  measured	  by	  
procedures	  ensuring	  detachment	  from	  the	  objects	  of	  study	  (as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  positive	  models	  
of	  science),	  but	  rather	  the	  growth	  of	  knowledge	  in	  interacting	  with	  them.	  Dialogue	  is	  a	  
dominant	  principle	  of	  reflexive	  science.	  In	  my	  case,	  this	  includes	  the	  dialogue	  between	  me	  and	  
the	  individuals	  I	  interview,	  the	  dialogue	  I	  as	  a	  researcher	  engage	  in	  with	  the	  information	  
presented	  by	  interviewees	  and	  different	  literatures,	  the	  dialogue	  I	  try	  to	  illustrate	  between	  an	  
energy	  policy	  making	  process	  and	  the	  political	  economy	  substrate	  in	  which	  it	  was	  embedded,	  
and	  a	  framework	  dialogue	  guided	  by	  different	  disciplinary	  knowledge.	  	  
	   Such	  an	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  carries	  the	  risks	  of	  unfocused	  analysis,	  so	  I	  have	  
attempted	  to	  ground	  my	  organizational	  structure	  through	  tracing	  out	  the	  genealogy	  of	  the	  RPS.	  
As	  a	  result,	  this	  thesis	  is	  overarchingly	  chronological.	  However,	  the	  1994-­‐1996	  renewable	  
energy	  debate	  is	  re-­‐presented	  with	  different	  lenses	  in	  sections	  3.2,	  4.2,	  4.3,	  and	  4.4	  to	  show	  
how	  different	  theories	  and	  frameworks	  help	  deepen	  our	  understanding	  of	  what	  was	  happening	  
in	  the	  process.	  Figures	  2,	  3,	  6,	  7—as	  well	  as	  5—graphically	  render	  some	  of	  this	  layering.	  By	  
representing	  a	  progression	  of	  what	  narratives	  are	  presented	  in	  official	  documents,	  through	  
secondary	  literatures,	  in	  how	  stakeholders	  talked	  about	  the	  debate,	  and	  in	  situating	  it	  into	  a	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political	  economy	  context,	  this	  sequencing	  attempts	  to	  show	  what	  kinds	  of	  understandings	  
become	  emphasized	  or	  obscured.	  Presenting	  the	  genealogy	  of	  a	  particular	  policy	  concept	  also	  
means	  that	  the	  perspectives	  and	  actions	  of	  some	  actors	  will	  be	  emphasized	  more	  than	  those	  of	  
others,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  are	  their	  voices	  the	  dominant	  ones.	  Many	  others	  contributed	  to	  the	  
debate	  on	  renewables	  policy	  and	  their	  perspectives	  inform	  this	  thesis’	  attempt	  at	  a	  more	  
balanced	  and	  thorough	  understanding.	  
	   Much	  of	  the	  empirical	  foundation	  of	  this	  thesis	  comes	  from	  interviews	  with	  key	  
participants.	  The	  12	  people	  I	  interviewed	  shared	  insights	  that	  were	  often	  unspoken	  of	  in	  the	  
documented	  literature.	  These	  interviews	  were	  complemented	  by	  considerable	  work	  with	  legal	  
documents,	  other	  primary	  documents	  and	  artifacts,	  many	  different	  types	  of	  secondary	  
literatures,	  including	  scholarly	  publications	  written	  by	  proponents	  of	  different	  policies,	  trade	  
journals,	  and	  media	  coverage.	  During	  my	  field	  research	  in	  California,	  I	  visited	  several	  law	  
schools,	  the	  California	  State	  Archives,	  and	  the	  California	  State	  Legislature	  to	  access	  archival	  
materials	  and	  conduct	  additional	  repository-­‐specific	  research.	  	  
Mapping	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  renewables	  policy	  debate-­‐-­‐through	  its	  actors,	  institutions,	  
processes,	  and	  prevailing	  frameworks—with	  theories	  about	  science	  and	  technology	  policy	  and	  
political	  economy	  informed	  my	  analytical	  framework.	  The	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  political	  
economy	  enabled	  me	  to	  delve	  into	  a	  particular	  case	  study—the	  origins	  of	  the	  RPS	  in	  the	  
1990s—while	  situating	  it	  in	  a	  broader	  context	  of	  regulatory	  structures	  and	  historical	  patterns.	  
	  




	  	   80	  
8.2 Interview	  Acknowledgements	  
This	  research	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  the	  critical	  insights	  I	  gained	  from	  
interviews	  and	  the	  assistance	  I	  received	  during	  my	  fieldwork.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Tom	  Gray,	  
Jeff	  Deyette,	  Jennifer	  Tachera,	  Lawrence	  Baird,	  Lindsay	  North,	  Yuliana	  Mendez,	  and	  Walter	  
Cook	  for	  their	  time	  and	  assistance	  in	  guiding	  me	  to	  indispensable	  materials	  and	  people.	  
I	  am	  grateful	  to	  the	  following	  interviewees	  for	  their	  generosity	  in	  time	  and	  knowledge.	  
Interviewees	  are	  listed	  with	  the	  dates	  on	  which	  I	  interviewed	  them,	  along	  with	  their	  roles	  and	  
organizations	  during	  the	  1994-­‐1996	  California	  restructuring	  process.	  
*	  	  *	  	  *	  
	  
Donald	  Aitken.	  April	  9,	  2014.	  West	  Coast	  Representative,	  Union	  of	  Concerned	  Scientists.	  
	  
Ralph	  Cavanagh.	  April	  10,	  2014.	  Energy	  Program	  Co-­‐Director,	  Natural	  Resources	  Defense	  
Council.	  
	  
James	  Hendry.	  April	  1,	  2014.	  Adviser	  to	  Commissioner	  P.	  Gregory	  Conlon,	  California	  Public	  
Utilities	  Commission.	  
	  
Dan	  Kirshner.	  March	  28,	  2014.	  Senior	  Economic	  Analyst,	  Environmental	  Defense	  Fund,	  West	  
Coast	  Office.	  
	  
Kip	  Lipper.	  April	  2,	  2014.	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  to	  Senator	  Byron	  Sher,	  California	  State	  Senate.	  
	  
Jody	  London.	  July	  7,	  2014.	  Adviser	  to	  Commissioner	  Jessie	  Knight,	  Jr.,	  California	  Public	  Utilities	  
Commission.	  
	  
Alan	  Nogee.	  April	  1,	  2014.	  Senior	  Energy	  Analyst,	  Union	  of	  Concerned	  Scientists.	  	  
	  
Nancy	  Rader.	  April	  14	  and	  July	  22,	  2014.	  West	  Coast	  Representative,	  American	  Wind	  Energy	  
Association.	  
	  	  
Randy	  Swisher.	  April	  2	  and	  July	  9,	  2014.	  Executive	  Director,	  American	  Wind	  Energy	  Association.	  
	  
Byron	  Sher.	  March	  31,	  2014.	  California	  State	  Assembly	  Member	  (December	  1980	  –	  March	  
1996),	  Chairman	  of	  Assembly	  Committee	  on	  Natural	  Resources.	  California	  State	  Senator	  (March	  
1996	  –	  December	  2004).	  
	  	   81	  
	  
Kathy	  Treleven.	  March	  31,	  2014.	  Assistant	  to	  the	  Vice	  President	  of	  Regulation,	  Pacific	  Gas	  &	  
Electric	  Co.	  
	  
Robin	  Walter.	  March	  31,	  2014.	  Project	  Manager	  in	  Regulatory	  Policy,	  Southern	  California	  Edison	  
Co.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
